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Summary
The main purpose of the thesis is twofold, first to provide a review of the literature on
inflation expectations, and second, to empirically analyze Norwegian survey data. In the
literature review, I trace the role of expectations at various points during the development
of macroeconomic theory, to highlight how our understanding of inflation expectations un-
der different circumstances has changed. How inflation expectations should be treated is
an unresolved debate in the literature, hence the need for a thorough review. I review
some proposals to explain the behavior of inflation expectations, among them expectations
models that incorporate learning, sticky information and heterogeneous estimation rules.
Among the noteworthy characteristics of measured inflation expectations are that expecta-
tions are heterogeneous between demographic groups, and that expectations become more
forward-looking when inflation is costlier to ignore. The literature has been concerned with
reconciling such facts with theory.
In the empirical part of this thesis, I consider what surveying households can contribute
to our ability of pinning down what inflation expectations currently are, and what they tell
us about inflation in the future. I therefore analyze empirically Norwegian survey data that
concern inflation expectations along three dimensions.
First,I look at the information gathering habits of ordinary households regarding devel-
opments in the economy, and the knowledge they possess about inflation dynamics, using
a survey designed for this thesis. I find that there is a great deal of uncertainty among
the respondents about how inflation will develop over the next twelve months, uncertainty
which is perhaps not reflected in the survey measures of inflation expectations in Norway.
I also find that many respondents are asked to state their expectations about future infla-
tion without being entirely sure about how inflation is affected by monetary policy, or how
inflation is defined.
Second, I examine the predictive ability and rationality of the survey measures of in-
flation expectations. I estimate by OLS a simple relationship between expected 12 month
ahead inflation and realized inflation, to establish whether the survey measures have pre-
dictive value. I find that the survey expectations of households are less accurate than those
of economists, business executives and labor organizations, especially regarding inflation in
prices of domestically produced goods. I then formulate a VAR between the survey measures
and realized inflation, in order to test for Granger-causality between the variables. I find
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that households’ expectations do not Granger-cause inflation, while there is some weak evi-
dence that expectations of businesses and economists do, for some of the inflation measures
concerned.
Third, I adopt a model of sticky information, which has as its basic premise that only a
share of agents in the economy get access to current information that professional forecasters
communicate every period. As a result, the aggregate inflation expectations should contain
elements of professional forecasts that date from earlier periods. I evaluate this hypothesis
by formulating the relationship between households’ expectations and experts’ forecasts
as an Autoregressive Distributed Lag-model, and find that there is likely a cointegrating
relationship between the survey measures, as well as significant lagged dependency, which
supports the hypothesis that information is transmitted with a lag to a part of the households
in the economy.
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1 Introduction
The important role of sentiment of economic agents in determining macroeconomic outcomes
has been recognized for as long as macroeconomics has been studied separately. Arguably
the founder of the discipline, John Maynard Keynes, emphasized how animal spirits1 could
be an autonomous cause of fluctuation or a feedback mechanism into the economy (Carroll,
2003). Nowadays the preferred term is expectations, and albeit less poetic, it is an equally
potent phenomenon. Whether private economic agents’ beliefs about the future development
of the economy is something monetary authorities should be concerned with has been a
contentious issue, and it is only in the past few decades that their significance for the actual
development of the economy has been appreciated, as well as their essential role in any
government’s attempts to actually influence that development.
When individuals and businesses make economic decisions, they are aware that they
will have to stay by their decisions long into the future, living with the consequences of
their decisions, good or bad. It is therefore essential to try to imagine how future economic
conditions will be, because these conditions measure the soundness of their decisions. Future
inflation is especially salient to the agents. The cost of repaying a loan to finance housing
or a business investment is greatly affected by how much prices increase in the mean time.
Given a constant interest rate and a loan principal given in nominal terms, higher inflation
will make the value of the debt smaller. For this reason, it is the real interest rate, i.e. the
nominal interest rate minus expected inflation, that matters when economic decisions are
made. A higher expected future inflation makes the real interest rate lower, which makes it
more attractive to take up credit and undertake investments, increasing the activity in the
economy.
Not only new debt-financed investments, but also the vast stock of private debt, which
is one of the pillars of the modern economy, is hugely affected by changes in the expected
future inflation. If expected inflation is reduced, causing a higher real interest rate, taking
up a mortgage to buy a house will be less desirable. The effect will be that house prices fall,
or increase less than they otherwise would. Existing mortgages will therefore have a lower
Loan-to-Value ratio2 than before, increasing the debt burden on the debtors.3 Because the
1Keynes put large emphasis on the sentiment of investors, who could be swayed by “animal spirits” in
waves of optimism or pessimism, creating booms or recessions by moving in unison.
2Usually, banks will only allow a mortgage loan that is a certain fraction of the value of the property,
leaving debtors to finance part of the investment with their own savings. This fraction is the Loan-to-Value
ratio.
3In the extreme, such as during the Subprime crisis in the US, when little collateral was required, some
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price level will be lower than it otherwise would be, the real value of debt in the economy will
be larger, leaving less room for other expenses and making the economy suffer. Restrictive,
leaning against the wind4, monetary policy has been justified for reasons of financial stability,
but the mentioned effect could imply that these policies are partly misguided (Svensson,
2013). In many countries inflation has been exceptionally low during the last few years,
meaning the weight of the debt burden could be added to the economic hardships experienced
partly due to austerity policies.
Another way that expected inflation impacts the economy is through the exchange rate.
Higher expected inflation at home than abroad will reduce the future real value of capital,
and thereby reduce the return on investments at home, leading investors to seek higher
returns abroad. As a result, the demand for the local currency will fall, requiring a de-
preciation of the currency’s exchange rate against other currencies for supply and demand
to coincide. The exchange rate is lower than before, or in other words, one unit of local
currency can buy a lesser amount of foreign currency than before. This means the price
of goods produced abroad measured in the local currency will be higher, increasing the
price of all goods imported from other countries. As a result, imported inflation increases,
increasing the general level of prices. In addition, a lower exchange rate means exporters
at home enjoy higher competitiveness because the world prices they receive for their prod-
ucts translate into a higher amount of local currency. To the degree that producers do not
depend on imported inputs in their production, the cost of production, e.g. labor costs,
stay relatively constant. The increased competitiveness encourages higher production and
demand for labor and capital, and increases activity in the economy. This will eventually
also lead to higher inflation, meaning the increased competitiveness is temporary.
The central bank is the custodian of the links between the present and the future in
the economy. Among other things, it issues the money that allows trade to be separated in
time, and control the terms at which we can save money for the future in bank accounts.
Expectations are therefore especially salient for the central bank. For a long time, however,
central banks had no intention of affecting agents’ expectations by making their operations
understandable.5 The past two decades have witnessed a radical shift in the direction of more
debtors could be left “under water”, that is, their debt was larger than the value of their houses.
4Leaning against the wind refers to counter-cyclical policy aimed at dampening a rapid expansion (or
contraction) of activity by posting a higher (lower) interest rate than what would be warranted in a more
stable situation, to extinguish any asset bubbles that might arise. In many countries where inflation is very
low, a policy of leaning against the wind entails higher interest rate than what the concern for inflation in
isolation would suggest, to contain financial instabilities that might arise due to low costs of financing.
5Alan Greenspan admitted to purposefully “mumble with great incoherence” (Blinder, Ehrmann,
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monetary policy transparency. Before rational expectations took front seat in the literature,
the efficacy of monetary policy actions was thought to depend on an unsuspecting public.
It was thought that the government could take advantage of the trade-off between inflation
and employment by administering surprise inflation. This is no longer a widely held view.
Instead, monetary policy has come to be about convincing the public that the central bank
will succeed in its plans. The immediate effects of ECB Governor Mario Draghi’s statement
that he would do “whatever it takes” to save the Euro in 2012, and then Fed Governor
Ben Bernanke saying the Fed would do “everything possible” to restore the economy in the
wake of the financial crisis, are testament to the importance of expectations on monetary
policy effectiveness. The reason why statements such as these have such incredible effects
is that they not only reveal what actions will be taken today, but delivers a convincing
commitment that those measures will be upheld into the future. Central banks only have
direct control over the interest rate on short term instruments such as the overnight deposit
rate, therefore, as Blinder (1999) points out, managing expectations is key to gain influence
over longer term interest rates:
“Expectations about future central bank behavior provide the essential link be-
tween short rates and long rates. A more open central bank ... naturally con-
ditions expectations by providing the markets with more information about its
own view of the fundamental factors guiding monetary policy..., thereby creating
a virtuous circle. By making itself more predictable to the markets, the central
bank makes market reactions to monetary policy more predictable to itself. And
that makes it possible to do a better job of managing the economy. ” (Blinder,
1999, cited in Blinder et al., 2008)
Especially when interest rates approach their zero lower bound, as they have in many
countries since the start of the Great Recession, the ability to influence inflation expectations
is a valuable asset, since real interest rates would be lower the higher the expectations.
With nominal interest rates close to zero, this is the only way of reducing the real interest
rate. Unconventional monetary policy in the aftermath of the Great Recession, such as
quantitative easing measures taken by the US Fed and the BoE, is meant to have an influence
on long term interest rates, which are important determinants of future economic conditions.
If the central bank through its unconventional measures can convince economic agents that
Fratzscher, De Haan, & Jansen, 2008). Paul Volcker, in his time as Fed chairman, defended the limited
communication issued by the Fed by arguing that communication commits.
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future interest rates will be low, they will look more favorably on the future prospects of
the economy, and revise their inflation expectations upward.
Also in the functioning of conventional monetary policy, inflation expectations have
been assigned major importance, and have been recognized as one of the central transmis-
sion mechanisms of monetary policy (Armantier et al., 2011). By managing the public’s
expectations, central banks can increase the effectiveness of their policy instruments for sta-
bilizing the economy, and better achieve their long term goals of price and financial stability.
Committing to an inflation target has gained almost universal support as the best way of
achieving these goals. There is a wide consensus in the literature that implementation of
inflation targets resulted in consistently lower inflation rates in countries that adopted them
(Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007, Vega & Winkelried, 2005, Hyvonen, 2004).6 Studies
also show that inflation expectations are better anchored, i.e. expectations do not change
much even though inflation might fluctuate, in countries with inflation targets than in others
(Ehrmann, 2014 Levin et al., 2007). While other types of targets can also accomplish a low
and steady price growth, an inflation target has the advantage that it is easy to understand
and that it focuses attention on the target. This is especially important, considering the
independent effect that expectations has on the economy.
There are drawbacks of openness, however. Announcing too soon what policy measures
are to be taken can make them take effect sooner than desired. US Fed vice-chairman Stanley
Fischer recently argued that the exceptional forward guidance that has been provided by
the Fed during the Great Recession should be toned down as the US economy approaches
normality (Applebaum, 2015). Fed representatives have adamantly refused to give any
precise date for interest rate increases, only saying they are conditional on growth and
inflation reaching a robust level.7 Some smaller central banks (in Norway, Sweden, New
Zealand, and the Czech Republic) also publish forecasts for the key policy rate, which
6One argument against view is that early adopters of inflation targeting had fiscally prudent governments
and central banks that were reputable in advance, which in itself would make it easier to reduce inflation
from high levels that were seen as unsustainable (Johnson, 2002). Alternatively, countries with high rates
of inflation found it necessary to implement a target that commits, and regression towards the mean made
these countries reduce inflation rates quicker than others. Both of these explanations are in essence that
the choice of implementing an inflation target was an endogenous choice.
7In March 2014, Fed Governor Janet Yellen revealed that the Fed considered six months after bond-
buying programs (QE) end is an appropriate time schedule for when interest rate increases should commence,
whereas previously the most precise time frame the Fed would admit to was “considerable time after.” In an
attempt to lessen the character of forward guidance of the wording used by the FOMC, they have replaced
the reference to an unspecified future date with the even less specific promise of having“patience” in regards
to rate hikes. In March 2015, this term was subsequently removed, which made observers think interest rate
increases are soon to be expected. Governor Yellen dismissed these conclusions.
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undoubtedly clarifies the intentions of the central banks moving forward, but runs the risk
of selling the public an interest rate path that is subject to change when unanticipated
shocks hit the economy. As these examples illustrate, optimal communication of central
banks is situationally dependent.8
All things considered, central banks should limit themselves in how much informa-
tion they communicate, as there are limits to how much information agents can digest
(Kahneman, 1973), and the noise that distort the main message will be more severe the
more information agents have to sift through (Blinder et al., 2008). In addition, the central
bank’s information set itself is plagued with noise, e.g. with respect to the construction of
the output gap and the identification of shocks. If the central bank has limited information,
communication could be counterproductive. However, the central banks do spend vast re-
sources on monitoring the economy, more than any other party, and has the public’s ear,
which suggests that well-crafted communication should be one of their main preoccupa-
tions. When it comes to the central bank’s intentions and planned actions, no one is better
informed than the central bank.
Managing expectations is to a large degree about securing long term price stability and
making sure expectations are anchored on target, but it will also play a role for policy in
the medium term where the issue is how to counteract shocks to the economy. Svensson
(1997) points to the non-feasibility of targeting inflation in itself, as monetary policy has a
lag of one to three years before it takes effect, making it difficult for central banks to react
to shocks in a timely manner. Instead, he shows that an inflation target is equivalent to an
intermediate forecast target, where the aim is to get the central bank’s forecast for future
inflation to line up with the inflation target. This makes it less important to emphasize in
communication that the efforts to achieve the target will take effect gradually, as the time it
takes for inflation to move towards the target is built into the inflation forecasts. This does
however make precise forecasts crucial, and where forecasts of inflation is concerned, theory
tells us that it is expectations that is the deciding factor. The central bank’s ability to make
good forecasts of inflation depends on its capability of understanding what determines the
public’s inflation expectations (Bernanke, 2007).
When executing monetary policy, a big challenge for central banks is to cross the divide
between theory and practice. Because the real world is infinitely more complex than any
economic model, there is no clear cut transmission between monetary policy bank lending
8See Dieffenthaler (2014) for further discussion of central bank communication.
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and market interest rates that central banks can say with certainty will behave in a specific
way. Instead, monetary policy is performed in incremental fashion, measuring the effects,
then evaluating the need for additional efforts. Likewise, there is no obvious way of measur-
ing many of those variables that monetary policy is guided by, such as the output gap. This
applies particularly to inflation expectations, which is an especially fleeting concept. Whose
inflation expectations is the most important? Should we take the conclusions from theory
to heart, and consider inflation expectations to be a disaggregated phenomenon that comes
about in the process of every agent’s optimizing behavior, which means we should go directly
to the source and give equal weight to each individual’s beliefs, or should we let the more
practical aggregate market indicators guide us, which have to abide the strict judgment of
market forces and therefore provide an honest measure of expectations? In the first case,
surveying individuals indiscriminately seems like the way to go to acquire a measure of what
inflation expectations are. In the second case, methods exist to derive inflation expectations
from market instruments that protect the investor from the risk of inflation. If these do not
exist, as in Norway, a decent proxy could be to survey experts who have a close ear to the
economy, such as economists and analysts in the financial industry, business and academia.
The main purpose of the thesis is twofold. First, I trace the role of expectations at var-
ious points during the development of macroeconomic theory in past decades, to highlight
how our understanding of inflation expectations under different circumstances has changed.
Disagreement about how to treat inflation expectations in the behavior of agents and vari-
ables in the economy is a thread that runs through this entire history. No consensus has
been reached in the literature, I therefore present a thorough literature review that seeks to
relate the differing views to each other. Along with the increased attention given to infla-
tion expectations by market participants and central banks in later decades, the increasing
availability of data has allowed for research that better our understanding of how inflation
expectations are formed. I look at how this has reflected back at the modeling of macroe-
conomics, what challenges it has revealed for our ability to measure inflation expectations
accurately, and how we can obtain a better understanding of the formation of inflation
expectations.
Second, a question that motivates this thesis is what surveying households can contribute
to our ability of pinning down what inflation expectations currently are, and what they tell
us about inflation in the future. I therefore analyze empirically Norwegian survey data that
concern inflation expectations along three dimensions. First, I look at responses from a
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one-time survey designed for this thesis, where I ask respondents about their knowledge
of what goes on in the economy, as an informal test of many of the assumptions that is
standard fare in macroeconomic theory, e.g. rational, forward-looking expectations. The
aim is to examine whether there are benefits in measuring inflation expectations by survey-
ing indiscriminately, by targeting households as respondents. I find that a large share of
respondents does not seem to posses the information, or knowledge needed to give a rational
forecast of inflation. Second, I analyze survey data from the largest Norwegian survey on
inflation. I use established methods to determine how accurate the survey forecasts are,
with a special emphasis on those of households. I examine the accuracy of survey forecasts
by OLS, before I look at the dynamic relationship between survey measures of expectations
and realized inflation in a VAR setup. The data allows me to separate between the ex-
pectations of households, economists, businesses and labor organizations, which makes it
possible to evaluate the relative accuracy of the different groups. It is reasonable to assume
that the three latter groups possess more information and knowledge about what determines
inflation, leading me to expect that these groups’ forecasts are more accurate than those of
households. I find that there is little correspondence between households’ survey expecta-
tions and inflation, while economic experts, business executives and labor organizations are
better able to forecast inflation, and particularly movements in inflation that are determined
by fundamentals in the economy, i.e. the parts of CPI that consist of prices on domestically
produced goods and services. Third, I pursuit a hypothesis stemming from the literature on
sticky information, proposing heterogeneity in households’ inflation expectations because of
information slowly dispersing in the economy. Current information is assumed to originate
from professional forecasters, and then circulated to households through news outlets. Be-
cause the absorption of new information is not perfect, the hypothesis is that households
expectations contains elements of past inflation forecasts made by experts. I perform a
test of a cointegrating relationship between experts’ forecasts and households’ expectations,
and find that expectations do move towards the forecast, suggesting a relationship where
information is distributed with a lag. I interpret this as support for the theoretical model
of sticky information that I adapt.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: In section 2, I review the role of inflation
expectations in macroeconomic theory throughout its history. Recently, low interest rates
combined with low inflation has posed a conundrum for central bankers in many countries. In
section 3, I review the literature concerned with how inflation expectations can contribute to
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such problems and how expectations formation will itself be affected. Section 4 presents some
alternative models of expectations which start out from behavioral assumptions that detract
from rationality, to meet the limitations of theory in explaining inflation. In section 5, I look
at how inflation expectations are measured using market data and surveys. This section also
sheds light on methodological problems that arise when measuring inflation expectations.
In section 6, I analyze a cross-sectional data set of Norwegian households, before I in section
7 analyze the forecasting ability of the largest Norwegian inflation expectations survey. I
do further analysis in section 8, concerning relationships between the survey measures. All
analysis in this thesis is performed using Stata or SPSS. Section 9 concludes.
2 The role of expectations in macroeconomic theory
I opened this thesis with a reference to Keynes’ (1936) pioneering contribution to macroe-
conomics, because of the central role he appointed to expectations in explaining booms
and busts. Theorists both before and after have also had to account for the effect that
expectations have, in one way or another, which I seek to provide an overview of in this
section.
Macroeconomics as a discipline was born out of the Great Depression, when the persistent
slump in demand and high unemployment rates all over the developed world left a lasting
impression on generations of regular people and academics alike. Before then, the reigning
principle in discussions of the macroeconomy was Say’s Law, postulating that supply will
create its own demand. According to Say (1855), agents in the economy will offer goods
for sale because they in turn want to buy other goods. Money only serves the purpose of
a temporary means of exchange, a savings glut can therefore not occur. There can be no
supply above demand. If there is unemployment, it is because there is a lack of specific
specialized labor, and an abundance of labor of other types.
J. M. Keynes argued forcefully against this belief in his General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money (1936). There, he pointed out that for long periods of time, consumers
and businesses could refrain from undertaking investments and rather hold on to their
money, because of expectations that spending the money now would yield less utility than
simply stuffing it in the mattress. In an environment where the outlook of future returns
on investments are bad, the usual assumption that savings equals investments might not
hold. In addition, because of the multiplier effect, decreased consumption and increased
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saving can lead to a contraction in output and eventually a reduction in saving itself, the
so-called paradox of thrift. Keynes’ most important message was that when private demand
failed, the government should step in and cover the shortfall by launching public works
programs and ease the conditions businesses face for undertaking investments, and institute
automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance. Central banks, while still beholden
to the fixed exchange rate system of the Gold Standard, and later Bretton Woods, should
have some room for accommodative monetary policy. Keynes argued that what mattered
for economic agents considering whether to undertake an investment was the real interest
rate they faced, i.e. the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation. The job of the
government in a downturn, according to Keynesian macroeconomics, is therefore to raise
inflation expectations and lower real interest rates, making investment more attractive. This
relationship is epitomized by the Phillips curve.
Looking at historical records, Phillips (1958) found that there was an inverse relationship
between inflation rates and unemployment. The implication was that governments could
combat unemployment by allowing for higher money growth and higher inflation. The
Phillips curve has therefore been seen as underlying the program of inflationist policy-makers
in the late 60s and early 70s. The increased confidence in the methodological advances in
econometrics and optimal control found its expression in the governance philosophy of New
Economics, which prescribed active fiscal and monetary policy to achieve full employment of
economic resources (Orphanides & Williams, 2005). Quite to the contrary, the early 70s was
characterized by stagflation in the US, with high unemployment and double-digit inflation.
Some contest that the interpretation of the Phillips Curve that the inflation-unemployment
trade-off could be exploited for lasting efficiency gains was the consensus among economists
(Forder, 2010), rather holding the view that this portrayal of the economics profession at
that time made a convenient target for the dissidents who would later come to the fore.
Probably the most famous critic of the adherents to the Phillips curve proposition was
Milton Friedman (M. Friedman, 1968), who asserted that the relationship would only hold
in the short run. Friedman offered an early argument of the importance of expectations for
the economy, by emphasizing the difference between anticipated, ex ante, values of variables,
and realized, ex post, values. A discrepancy between them would eventually lead agents to
revise their anticipation. Friedman thus introduced the concept of adaptive expectations.
Friedman applied Wicksell’s (1936) notion of a natural rate of interest to unemployment.
At any time there is an equilibrium of the employment rate and real wages given by the
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fundamentals of the economy. Maintaining employment at this level will make real wages
increase at a rate consistent with capital accumulation and productivity. Using monetary or
fiscal policies to lower unemployment below this rate will result in upward pressure on real
wage rates. The consequent increase in demand will make the prices of finished goods and
services increase as well, which is a prerequisite for the extra demand for labor given that
production costs increase. So far, this is in line with the Phillips curve predictions. However,
workers will come to realize that the price increases neutralize their higher income, leading
to higher wage demands. Since wages are only adjusted at low-frequent intervals, less often
than prices on finished goods, a situation where unemployment is below the natural rate can
persist for a while. Expectations of future prices matter for the workers’ demands, however,
so if the policy is maintained, workers will get ahead of the curve, and close the gap between
production costs and goods prices. At those terms, it is no longer profitable for employers
to hire the extra labor. That is, in the long run, governments can create as much inflation as
they want, unemployment won’t budge from the natural rate; the Phillips curve is vertical.
Another, related, line of attack against the classical macroeconomics that was launched
during the 1960’s concerned the degree of understanding that economic agents had about
how the economy worked, and how this, in turn, influenced the working of the economy.
Muth (1961) was an early proponent of assuming rational expectations among agents. His
and others’ critique of traditional macroeconomics was that economic models lacked a de-
scription of the process by which economic agents acquire knowledge and use it to form
expectations about economic development (B. M. Friedman, 1979). The main problem was
that the models only treated the relationship between aggregate variables, without taking a
peek at the underlying processes that defined the aggregate relationships. Muth (1961) and
others argued that the unit under analysis should be the individual decision maker in the
economy rather than the economy as a whole, because the economy is the sum of individu-
als’ actions. On this backdrop, Muth (1961) introduced the idea that economic agents have
an economic model in mind when making economic decisions. All information available to
the agents is used to model the economy, correctly calculating the behavior of consumers
and government agencies on the basis of their objective functions. Subsequent research has
retained this definition of rational expectations. Although Muth (1961) held that this was
not necessarily an accurate description of how the economy really worked, he defended the
assumption on the grounds that on average, expectations will be accurate. It is also argued
that in the aggregate, better informed agents will exploit any opportunity of arbitrage so
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that the result predicted by the model comes about in the end.
Assuming rational expectations implied that individuals were forward-looking rather
than backward-looking in forming expectations. Agents with backward-looking expectations
infer a model of the economy that they can piece together from their observation of how
variables behaved in relation to each other historically, while agents with forward-looking
expectations know the true model of the economy and use only the most recent information
about relevant variables to form their expectations. In this way, the agents would not make
systematic errors in their predictions, the only deviation from the realized variables would
be stochastic errors realized after expectations had formed.
Muth (1961) especially points to the tractability of letting the same general assumptions
apply to different dynamic problems, instead of more ad hoc assumptions about how expec-
tations are formed. Rational expectations could be incorporated in all models in a general
way.9
An especially prescient critique against the hopes of fine-tuning the economy using econo-
metrics to design policy was levelled by Lucas Jr (1976), who pointed out that the behavioral
patterns of individual consumers and firms could not be assumed to stay constant when
policy changed. The estimation of economic systems using econometrics relies on historical
data to uncover the relationships in the economy. Policy changes, however, like instituting a
tax, constitute structural breaks that make past realizations of the variables uninformative
about what the effect of the policy change in question will be. The aggregate variables
are determined at the individual level, and expectations adjust according to the changing
environment. The Lucas-critique therefore does not only condemn the practice of taking a
birds-eye view of the macroeconomy, but provides hope that the aggregate relationships can
be well understood if they are only analysed from the ground up. Deriving macroeconomic
models from microeconomic foundations was the obvious solution, something which fit the
increasingly technical tool-kit of economics well. A representative agent is thought to opti-
mize at every point in time taking state variables as given, which determines variables such
as wages and prices in equilibrium. As a result, prices should be completely flexible, without
frictions that would hinder them from taking the optimal values. This means expectations
leave no role whatsoever for monetary policy to affect the business cycle. If the central bank
would issue more money to try to stimulate the economy, private agents immediately react
9Additionally, if theory or evidence suggest different processes of expectations formation, there is every
possibility for assuming a combination of rational and backward-looking expectations.
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with a corresponding change in prices, making money completely neutral. This is a feature
of the class of growth models called Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, where, as the name
implies, goods and services are always traded at their real values.
The assumption of rational expectations has even more damning implications for the
optimism of the Phillips curve than Friedman’s critique. The natural unemployment rate
argument was taken further by Barro and Gordon (1983), showing that an activist central
bank, targeting unemployment at a lower level than the natural rate, would be exposed
immediately by rational agents. Having rational expectations, they would anticipate the
attempts of surprise inflation by central banks seeking to increase the activity in the econ-
omy. By increasing inflation by surprise, profit margins of firms would increase, making it
more attractive to hire and produce more. Rational agents will expect this higher inflation,
and demand higher nominal wages to offset higher prices, leaving no room for surprises, and
the end result would only be higher inflation and unchanged unemployment. This was the
origin of the concept of an inflationary bias in the central bank’s objective function, which
is stronger the more the central bank tries to reduce unemployment below its natural level,
and set the ball rolling in the discussion on whether central banks should be independent
– to be free of political pressures, run by a conservative governor (Svensson, 1995, Rogoff,
1985), and operate according to rules rather than discretion (Kydland & Prescott, 1977).
The introduction of micro-foundations and rational expectations in macroeconomics cer-
tainly improved the mathematical elegance of the models. However, the huge influence of
its proponents on the economic literature notwithstanding, the assumption of rational ex-
pectations has not held up very well to the mounting empirical evidence on expectations
formation (Armantier et al., 2011).
As discussed, RBC models that have rational expectations as its central feature leaves no
room for monetary policy. All practical experience show that central banks actually do have
the power to influence the economy to a certain degree. The reason that monetary policy
is effective is because of the persistence of inflation. Persistence in this context means that
the variable is dependent on its own history, in the form of lags in a regression framework.
Gordon’s (1982) triangle model of inflation incorporates this element:
pit =
T∑
s=t
aspis−t + b(Ut − U) + cχt + t (1)
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Here, inflation is dependent on its own lags, understood as working through backward-
looking, adaptive, expectations, as well as the unemployment gap, a measure of real activity,
and supply side variables summarized in χ. tis a shock to supply, with zero mean. While
in RBC-type models the real interest rate is determined by the optimizing behavior of
the agents, the central bank now has an influence over the real rate when expectations
are adaptive, since the price level does not react one to one with a change in the policy
rate, neutralizing the policy rate’s effect on the real rate. Since the real interest rate is
a determinant of demand for consumption and investment, the central bank can thereby
affect the activity level in the economy, at least in the short run. Accordingly, models with
adaptive expectations do not suffer from neutrality of monetary policy. As discussed earlier,
however, adaptive expectations are unsatisfactory when trying to model realistic dynamics
of the economy.
One way of incorporating rational, forward-looking expectations in models while keeping
the central bank’s ability to influence the economy intact has been to assume rigidities in
the price-setting behavior of otherwise rational, optimizing agents. The most common way
of doing this has been to apply staggered Calvo-type pricing, either in wages, goods prices
or both (Calvo, 1983). The simple story is that only a fraction of firms are allowed to change
their price at any given point in time. The average price level is therefore a combination
of updated and past prices. The agents take into account that they will have to wait to
adjust their prices again, setting a price that is as close to optimal for the whole period they
expect to have to wait. The appeal of this method is that “sticky” prices can be observed
all over the real economy. The median interval for price changes of firms is one year in the
US (Mankiw, 2001), and 9 months in Norway (Erlandsen, 2014). Because the use of sticky-
price models have restored focus to the demand-side of the economy, as well as allowing for
non-neutrality of monetary policy that was a characteristic of classical Keynesian models,
research that build on them has been classified as New Keynesian.
A standard New Keynesian inflation equation differs from the classical Phillips-curve in
that the dependence on the past is gone. As seen in equation (2), only expected inflation
matters, along with the output gap, y˜t,
10 and the disturbance t which encapsulates supply,
or cost-push, shocks:
10Like the unemployment gap, y˜t is a measure of real activity. The output gap is defined as the difference
between actual output and potential output, the level at which the economy is said to be at full capacity.
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pit = βEtpit+1 + γy˜t + t (2)
While New Keynesian models with sticky prices take care of the issue of monetary neutral-
ity, they cannot properly explain the persistence of inflation. The staggered price setting
clearly give some persistence to the price level, but the rate of change in the price level
– the inflation rate – can nevertheless change instantly. Because inflation persistence is
such a recognizable feature in all inflation data, a theory that does not account for it is
unsatisfactory.
With backward-looking expectations, as was assumed in the traditional Phillips-curve
relationship, inflation persistence is very much present. When shocks hit the economy, and
the central bank reacts by changing the policy rate, the rate of inflation could be slow to
adjust. In rational expectations models however, history should play no role, and inflation
should therefore react instantaneously to the changed economic environment.
Sargent (1982) pointed to the sudden end of four cases of hyperinflation as an argument
for the presence of rational expectations. In these cases, persistence in inflation seemed to
disappear immediately when the fundamentals of the economy changed. The extremely high
rates of inflation of these cases set them apart from the experience of most central banks
in recent times, where the issue is rather how to control inflation rates that are moderate
or even very low. The smooth, continuous behavior of various inflation measures, such as
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the post-war period, does not go well along with the
assumption that prices are completely flexible. There is indeed quite strong evidence of
persistence in US inflation over the period from 1960 to 2000. Persistence in other variables
could account for part of the inflation persistence, but not all of it. After 2000, however,
the persistence in inflation became very small and almost non-existent (Fuhrer, 2009). 11
The New Keynesian models are also plagued with some other issues that it is difficult to
reconcile with the data. For instance, in a sticky price model, the central bank can create
a disinflationary episode that leads to an output expansion, if it credibly announces the
disinflation beforehand. This works because agents that are informed of the central bank’s
intentions will start lowering their prices immediately, as well as inflation expectations,
11Fuhrer (2009) defines persistence as first order autocorrelation, i.e. the variable’s dependence on its
value in the previous period. Mathematically expressed by an AR(1)-process: vt = ρvt − 1 + t, where
ρ ∈ (−1, 1) ensures stationarity. t is a white noise error term. Fuhrer (2009) finds that the AR-1 coefficient
was between .5 and .8 between 1960 and 2000, and .2 after 2000.
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reducing inflation before the central bank starts reducing the money supply. This increases
real money balances in the economy and increases activity (Mankiw & Reis, 2001). In
reality, however, disinflation is associated with an output contraction. Furthermore, New
Keynesian models do not feature the considerable lag that exists between monetary policy
actions and their effects. There is no consensus on how long this lag is, and it will vary
under different circumstances, but estimates vary from one to three years passing before
monetary policy actions have their peak effect (Batini & Nelson, 2001).
Despite these drawbacks, the New Keynesian models have gained a prominent position
in the literature. It is reasonably successful in duplicating the path of inflation when fed
with economic data, and most of its dynamics is consistent with how we know monetary
policy affects the economy. It features a short run trade-off between inflation and output
stabilization in the presence of supply shocks, while monetary policy is neutral in the long
run. It provides some important lessons to central bankers, most importantly that monetary
policy is most effective when successfully managing inflation expectations.
Different estimation methods have been employed for New Keynesian parameter estima-
tion and out of sample forecasting. New Keynesian models were from the start estimated as
a system of simultaneous equations, i.e. as Dynamic Stochastic General Equlibrium (DSGE)
models, but limited-information methods, such as GMM,12 has become increasingly popular
methods of estimation (Roberts, 1995). The advantage that such limited-information meth-
ods do not impose a structure on any other equation than that of interest, thereby reducing
the chance of mis-specification, outweighs the disadvantage of less precise estimation results.
The problem that inflation expectations are not directly observable has been tackled in
various ways. Some have simply replaced expectations with realized values, as expectations
are assumed rational. Instrumental variable techniques have also been used, with lagged
inflation serving as instruments. Survey data provide a (crude) direct measure of inflation
expectations. Estimating a New-Keynesian Phillips curve using survey data was introduced
by Roberts (1995).
Nowadays, central banks use a wide variety of models to monitor the effect of monetary
policy and to forecast future inflation and output. These models typically contain a source
of sticky prices, leaving a role for monetary policy. A wide variety of different processes
12Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is an estimation method that rely on a set of population
moment conditions which derive from the econometric model. GMM requires fewer assumptions than
methods that rely on maximum likelihood estimation, where a full description of the data generating process
and correct specification of the model is required.
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with which expectations are formed is on the menu; rational expectations are not the only
option.
As this review has shown, the themes that at any time have been given most attention
by macroeconomic theorists are highly correlated with which trends are most prominent in
the macroeconomy at the same time. Examples of how this has shaped theory is the focus
on the demand side of the economy after the Great Depression and in the post war-era, and
the 180 degree shift towards supply side issues during the stagflation of the 70s. Theoretical
advances today take many cues from experiences of the Great Recession, and one poignant
challenge that has presented itself for theory is persistent low inflation in spite of low interest
rates. The next section describes how this has been addressed in the recent literature.
3 Low inflation territory: Inflation expectations adrift
Adopting an inflation target does not guarantee perfect coincidence between inflation and
the target. Periods where inflation is considerably above or below the target have often
occurred. With the large credibility gains that come from professing to and achieving the
inflation target, come potential losses from having inflation drift away. Following the Great
Recession, many advanced economies are now experiencing persistently low inflation, even
risking deflation, at the same time as interest rates are at record lows and growth only
seems to be picking up slowly. Will the low inflation lead to lower confidence that central
banks can reach their inflation target, causing expectations to become unanchored? Central
bank communication, explaining the gap between expectations and the target and sketching
possible policy reactions can help guide expectations back to target, if the information
provided is regarded as new information and the communication is credible.
Corder and Eckloff (2011) find that short- and medium-term inflation expectations in
14 inflation targeting countries do drift away from target in a sample of 23 episodes where
inflation showed a sustained deviation from target of at least 18 months between 1994 and
2011. This suggests that central banks might want to go to exceptional steps to jerk the
economy out of a period with off-target inflation. Otherwise, the central bank’s vigilance
in achieving its stated inflation target might be questioned, which would hurt credibility
and make monetary policy actions less effective. Worse, it could weaken the inflation tar-
gets gravitational pull for expectations. As a great deal of realized inflation is determined
by expectations, letting inflation expectations drift away from target might lead to a self-
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reinforcing spiral where the drift in expectations gain momentum. Across the many cases
of off-target episodes studied by Corder and Eckloff (2011), medium-term inflation expec-
tations seem to move gradually in the direction of deviation from target. Median inflation
expectations in the sample deviates in absolute value by one percentage point 12 months
into such an episode. It becomes increasingly costly for central banks to make expectations
revert back to target the longer the off-target periods last. It is a reasonable assumption
that this danger is reflected in central bank’s behavior.
Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014) allow for a tougher central bank response to prolonged
off-target inflation in a modified New Keynesian model. They assume that expectations are
partially forward-looking and partially backward-looking, and the weight of the backward-
looking element depends on the credibility of the central bank, which again depends on
past performance on hitting the inflation target. As a result, sustained periods of off-target
inflation makes expectations more backward-looking, and hence less strongly anchored and
harder to influence with monetary policy. The optimal interest rate rule is a nonlinear rule
that calls for sharper reactions when past inflation has deviated from target. In addition
to adjusting the policy rate to present deviation from target, it should also be adjusted to
deviations from target in earlier periods, to counteract the credibility loss, i.e. how strongly
expectations have become backward-looking. The authors call this a crediblity loss term in
the interest rate rule, which existence they find support in a sample of five inflation targeting
central banks (Neuenkirch & Tillmann, 2014).13
They estimate the size of the credibility loss term separately for episodes of negative
and positive deviations from target, and find a larger term when deviations from target
are negative, suggesting that worries of letting inflation expectations fall loom larger than
expectations drifting upwards (Neuenkirch & Tillmann, 2014). A possible explanation is
that fear of deflation will lead to strong responses to inflation rates that inch towards zero.
An implication of the results in this study is that announcing a policy target has to be
followed up by achieving it for it to be credible. It also means central banks, after prolonged
periods of off-target inflation, as has been experienced during the Great Recession, might
have to deal with a considerable credibility loss, that lessens the effect of monetary policy.
In a similar vein, Ehrmann (2014) asks whether the formation of inflation expectations
under persistently low inflation is different from when inflation is high. Using monthly
survey expectations data from a panel of 14 inflation targeting countries and the euro area
13Sweden, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
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as a whole, his analysis shows that when inflation has been low for a prolonged period,
12 months ahead inflation expectations become more backward-looking. This implies that
although inflation expectations are anchored on target on average, it will take longer for
them to return to target after a deviation. Ehrmann (2014) also shows that forecasters
disagree more when inflation is persistently low, suggesting inflation expectations are less
strongly anchored. Inflation forecasts are revised downwards when inflation is lower than
expected, but is not revised upwards when inflation is higher than expected. Furthermore, if
inflation strays away from the target, either upwards or downwards, disagreement increases
in inflation targeting countries, implying that there is an effect of moving away from the
target in either direction. Combined, the results suggest that inflation expectations returns
to target at a slower pace in an environment of low inflation.
An interesting example of inflation drifting away from target is found in Sweden, where
inflation and growth has been low for a long time. The central bank has until recently
nevertheless been following a policy of leaning against the wind to calm potential financial
instabilities.14 As a result, the policy rate has been kept higher than what would be optimal
if only the inflation rate and the output gap was considered. Letting inflation drop below
target – and at the same time anchor inflation expectations on target – is in itself bad for the
economy in that it raises real debt levels in the economy (Svensson, 2013). Increasing the
real debt level implies a wealth transfer from debtors to creditors, and lowers expected future
disposable income because debt servicing becomes more expensive, not ideal for economies
struggling to climb out of recession.
If, on the other hand, inflation expectations start to follow inflation downwards, the
central bank might have an even larger problem on its hands. As mentioned earlier, ex-
pectations of moderate inflation make it more attractive to undertake investments financed
by taking up credit, and spend money now rather than later, increasing today’s inflation.
If inflation expectations no longer provide this service, central banks have to do the job of
getting inflation back on track by lowering interest rates more. In many countries, rates are
already zero, and some are venturing into negative territory. Low inflation thus threatens
to become a very unshakable phenomenon, which reinforces itself by worsening sentiment
and future outlooks for growth.
Because of these experiences, which show that expectations formation is situationally
dependent, a better understanding of how inflation expectations are formed is even more
14For definition of leaning against the wind, see footnote 5.
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important. The efficacy of monetary policy is conditional on the manageability of expecta-
tions, it is therefore highly useful for central bank’s to know whether, and how, expectations
can be managed. In the next section, I present some of the advances in different ways of
modeling expectations formation, which start out from other assumptions than the rational
expectations tradition.
4 Understanding expectations
The review of how expectations enter into theory in section 2 reveals that although ex-
pectations are omnipresent in economic dynamics, we don’t have a full understanding of
them. Because the variable is unobservable, we have to rely on approximations that start
out from some general assumptions. Various attempts at doing this has had rational ex-
pectations as their point of reference, but the way their underlying assumptions differ from
rationality allow them to explain different aspects of how expectations behave. The sum of
the insights that these different proposals provide can increase our understanding of how
inflation expectations form. That is something which is valuable in itself, as Ben Bernanke
has expressed it: “A fuller understanding of the public’s learning rules would improve the
central bank’s capacity to assess its own credibility, to evaluate the implications of its policy
decisions and communications strategy, and perhaps to forecast inflation.” (Ben Bernanke,
cited in Armantier et al., 2012).
Different processes of expectations formation have been applied in attempts at estimating
macroeconomic models in the literature. Among them are models with sticky information
(Mankiw & Reis, 2001), in which the most recent information slowly disseminates into the
economy. The idea is that only a fraction of firms have accurate information about the
economy when they decide on their price: A λ share of the firms have forecasts based on
the most recent data, while a λ(1− λ) share have information from one period before, and
so on.15 This results in past expectations of current economic conditions affecting inflation
today. Changing economic conditions therefore allows for persistence in inflation by not
immediately materializing into changed pricing behavior, consistent with the persistence in
inflation observed in the data. That means the control gap, the time that passes before a
monetary policy action takes effect, is also accounted for by the model.
15The shares of agents who last updated their information in each period from now to infinitely many
periods back sums to one: λ+ λ(1− λ) + λ(1− λ)2 + ... = λ∑∞i=0 (1− λ)i = λ 11−(1−λ) = 1.
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Mankiw and Reis (2001) show impulse responses to a reduction in nominal GDP, when
the model features sticky information. Their results are given in figure 1. In a model with
rational expectations and sticky prices, inflation would display a jump similar to the shock
in GDP, with a gradual decay towards the stationary state. The sticky information model
captures a feature of the data, which is that inflation only slowly responds to the changed
circumstances, and the shock has effects on inflation for an extended amount of time.
Figure 1: Impulse response function with sticky information, sticky prices and backward-looking expectations. A shock of
-10 percent to aggregate demand is simulated at time 0. Source: Mankiw & Reis (2001)
The crucial difference between the models that underlie the impulse response functions
in figure 1 is that expectations in the sticky information model are formed rationally, with
the caveat that not all agents form expectations rationally all the time. In the sticky price-
model, expectations form rationally, i.e. agents know the true model. In the model with
backward-looking expectations, the expected inflation rate next period is simply the inflation
rate last period. The inertia in inflation expectations in a sticky information model, i.e. the
fact that expectations do not instantaneously respond to economic shocks, makes inflation
show similar persistence as in a model with adaptive, backward-looking expectations, which
is also encountered in the data. With adaptive expectations however, the negative demand
shock is followed by a boom in output after recovery from the initial shock, because inflation
expectations are propelled by the deviation of output from steady state, like in the Philips
curve in equation (2), and there is nothing anchoring inflation to the steady state. Rational
expectations, however weakly present in the sticky information-model, provides an anchor
that rules out such unrealistic fluctuations. This should make the model of sticky information
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more palatable for skeptics of New Keynesianism who do not believe in the quick recovery
that a New Keynesian model displays, although the requirement of micro-foundations would
perhaps call for a properly founded reason for why businesses use outdated information for
setting prices.
A reasonable story about such information dispersion, giving the sort of micro-foundations
needed, is proposed by Carroll (2003), who constructs a model where the agents in the econ-
omy update their expectations based on information from the news media, who in turn base
their stories on rational forecasts from professional forecasters. Not everyone pays atten-
tion to all macroeconomic news; any particular news story is absorbed by an individual
with a certain probability. The time it takes for the entire public to have learned that
macroeconomic circumstances have changed could therefore be substantial. Carroll (2003)
suggests this type of model, which is dubbed staggered information, to explain expectations
formation in a macro model with micro-foundations, similar to the role of Calvo-pricing in
a sticky-price model.16
The proposition that agents base their expectations on information gathered from reliable
sources is intuitively reasonable, and it is further backed up by a survey experiment in
Armantier et al. (2012). There, respondents are asked to give their forecast of future inflation
before and after they are provided with information about either past inflation or professional
forecasters’ predictions. They find that while a substantial fraction of respondents are
well-informed on past inflation or professional forecasts, as many as 37.5 percent predict
that inflation will be 5 percent or more. The average perception gap is therefore large.
When provided with accurate information, the respondents revise their forecasts, supporting
a model of expectation formation that is based on information gathering from the news.
Armantier et al. (2012) are optimistic about increasing the effort in informing the public, in
order to better manage expectations. A combination of different information-processing rules
and heterogeneous information sets is suggested for modeling purposes. The respondents are
provided information that is widely available, so their evidence does not support a theory
of fully rational expectations. What Armantier et al. (2012) also uncover is that there
are also wide disparities between demographic groups in their expectations of inflation;
heterogeneity in expectations is greater among women, ethnic minorities and less educated
agents. The same groups are also slower to update their expectations and have higher
16The model in (Carroll, 2003) is juxtaposed to the expectations data found in the Michigan Survey of
Households. Based on the regression results, the pure sticky expectations forecasting process is preferred to
a backward-looking process, even when combined.
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inflation expectations (Madeira & Zafar, 2012).
The apparent heterogeneities in survey respondents’ expectations pose a challenge for
modeling. Branch (2007, 2004) solves this by letting agents switch between different pre-
diction rules. He presupposes that the agents are uncertain which model is appropriate to
forecast inflation, and allows them to change their minds. The different predictors that are
available are (i) a VAR predictor, i.e. a full information forecast in the sticky information
framework,17 (ii) a univariate adaptive expectations predictor that is backward looking, and
(iii) a naive predictor taking last period’s inflation as the expectation. Instead of letting
heterogeneities be explained by stochastic processes, as in Mankiw and Reis (2001), the
agents choose what information to disregard by the choice of predictor, and they do this
purposefully, by evaluating which predictor yields highest benefit, i.e. by showing the low-
est mean squared prediction error in the prior period. Estimation is costly, affecting the
choice of method, which also provides an explanation for why the observed distributions of
predictors used by different respondents vary over time. The cost is assumed to be higher
the more often information is updated. The VAR contains 12 lags of inflation, output and
interest rates on treasury bills, which makes the VAR fit the data closely. Empirical tests
(Branch, 2007) show that all horizons of the VAR-predictor is used by some proportion of
respondents, proportions varying over time. As a result, the heterogeneity of expectations
formation is said to be dynamic. A static, geometric distribution of information updating,
like in Mankiw and Reis (2001), is rejected. In Branch (2004), it is shown that when a naive
predictor and an univariate adaptive expectations predictor is available, they will also be
chosen by a share of the agents, over the more rational VAR-predictor.
In a similar vein, Akerlof et al. (1996) argue that workers only inform themselves about
the inflation rate when it is too costly to ignore. High inflation and more news coverage has
coincided, consistent with Carroll (2003) in that forecasts are more rational during times
when inflation gets broad news coverage. This makes the cost of gathering information
lower, while the cost of neglecting new information gets higher, all in all supporting dynamic
heterogeneities in inflation expectations. This might be part of the answer to why it is easier
to end episodes of high inflation than moderate ones, recalling the argument of Sargent
(1982), as the public get intensely preoccupied with the inflation rate, and the probability
of updating gets close to one.
17The VAR-predictor comes in four editions, which vary in how often information is updated, from every
period to every twelfth period (3 periods and 9 periods in between).
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Staggered information could be complimented by an element of learning, whereby agents
estimate their model of the economy based on recent information about economic conditions.
Models that incorporate learning allow for the possibility that inflation expectations can
veer away from the central bank’s target and become unanchored. This could happen if the
central bank decides to pursue other goals than stable inflation, subscribing to a policy that
is not optimal for inflation targeting. Agents then incorporate the central bank’s behavior
into their models, with the effect of a credibility loss if agents believe the central bank
will be less aggressive in achieving stable inflation. Of course, learning would lead to re-
anchoring of inflation expectations if the central bank is insistent in its efforts to stabilize
inflation on target, which can be used to the central bank’s advantage. One mechanism that
emulates learning is that agents envisage a reduced form model of the economy, which they
continuously revise in light of new developments. Orphanides and Williams (2005) argue that
the Great Inflation of the 1970s in the US was caused by an underestimation of the natural
rate of unemployment, making monetary policy more expansionary than what was ideal and,
as a result, inflation skyrocketed. The increase in inflation was reinforced by expectations
adapting to the new circumstances; the private agents in the economy reestimated their
model of the economy with the most recent information. In the Orphanides and Williams
(2005) model, the monetary authority uses private agents’ expectations as inflation forecast.
Since expectations are formed with up-to-date information, based on an outdated economic
model, the inflation dynamics are similar to the models with backward-looking expectations,
i.e. with inflation persistence. However, the Orphanides and Williams (2005) model is not a
backward-looking model as such. The agents form expectations boundedly rational, limited
to their most recent experiences. Learning agents are mostly wrong about inflation, creating
inefficiencies, because they have limited information. This ascribes an important role for
central banks in refinement of communication to improve the information set of agents.
More informed agents would bring the dynamics of the model closer to those seen with
rational agents. As Orphanides and Williams (2005) show, the presence of learning in
inflation expectations highlights the role of credibility in the central bank policy tool-box.
If central banks can point to a history of aggressively fighting inflation, agents will expect
strong reactions to deviations from target in the future.
The way that sticky information models suggest information disperses throughout the
economy implies that central banks’ communication efforts are more effective if communi-
cation is targeted towards certain groups that act as opinion leaders relative to the rest of
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the public. It seems reasonable that financial market experts and labor organizations are
more attentive to central bank communication than e.g. households, which suggests that
the experts’ expectations are particularly amenable to expectations management efforts.
Ullrich (2008) finds that aggregate inflation expectations among such experts in Europe are
significantly influenced by ECB communication. Her study relies on the theoretical model
by Svensson (2003) for why communication affects expectations, which posits that part of
the gap between realized and expected inflation can be explained by the public not un-
derstanding the inflation expectations of the central bank due to not possessing the same
information. In the study, a wording indicator, categorizing specific hawkish or dovish terms
used in ECB statements, is used to show that the tone of ECB communication can partly
explain changes in inflation expectations in the ZEW survey.18 A similar result was found by
Jansen and De Haan (2007), who look at high frequency data, with focus on the difference
between the interest rate on a non-inflation-adjusted bond and an inflation-adjusted bond.
The authors find that central bank signals of a tightening of monetary policy had a signif-
icant effect on inflation expectations, but only in a period when macroeconomic indicators
suggested a shift in ECB’s policy stance would come, with tightening becoming increasingly
likely during autumn 2005. They further find that the effect is only apparent at the start
of a monetary policy tightening phase. Communication seemingly has the most effect when
it is accompanied by actual policy changes. Words have to be followed up by action to be
credible.19
Fracasso et al. (2003) use survey data to see if the message in central bank inflation
reports reach different groups equally. The content of an inflation report is judged differ-
ently on several measures, like credibility and completeness of information. Fracasso et al.
(2003) show that the more perceptions of the reports differ, the larger are the interest rate
surprises.20
In the literature, many suggestions to make inflation expectations act more realistically
in economic models have surfaced over the years. In this thesis I only touch upon some
of them, namely (i) models where sticky information prevents inflation from changing in-
stantaneously, (ii) models where agents choose between different forecasting rules, and (iii)
18The ZEW survey is a survey of economic sentiment among 350 financial experts about
the development in Germany, the Euro-zone, Japan, Great Britain and the US. Its website is
http://www.zew.de/en/publikationen/Konjunkturerwartungen/Konjunkturerwartungen.php3.
19I discuss this theme further in section 5.
20An interest rate surprise is defined as the difference in a market interest rate before and after announce-
ment of a change in the policy rate. If the policy interest rate change was anticipated, there should be no
change in market interest rates at the moment it was anticipated, everything else equal.
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models where information is completely available, but agents only re-estimate periodically.
These three proposals all approach the challenge of understanding inflation expectations
top-down. They acknowledge a macroeconomic phenomena like the persistence of inflation,
or the historical stagflation, and develop a story of expectations formation that is reasonably
realistic and squares with the observed phenomena. The bottom-up-approach, on the other
hand, is to measure inflation expectations empirically, and then model their behavior based
on the observed data. Controlled experiments can further increase our understanding of
why expectations develop the way they do. As already witnessed, survey data can be used
to support theories that aim at explaining aggregate inflation phenomena. The next section
provides an overview of how to measure inflation expectations empirically.
5 Measuring inflation expectations empirically
Even though inflation expectations are not directly observable, several methods exist for
extracting them from other data sources. In this section, I will first present two common
measures of inflation expectations, one based on financial market products, the other survey
based, together with a run-down of methodological challenges pertaining to the latter.
5.1 Financial market-based inflation expectations
In several countries, there exist financial market products that make it possible to get
an estimate of inflation expectations. These inflation expectations measures are in general
arrived at by deconstructing the yield of financial instruments specifically designed to protect
against inflation. One such instrument is Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS),
issued by the US government. The principal of the TIPS is adjusted along with CPI-
inflation, to make the real value of the principal stay constant. As non-adjusted government
bonds expose the investors to the risk of inflation eroding the value of their investment, they
demand a premium on the return to be willing to hold regular bonds, equal to the expected
gain the TIPS-holders enjoy from their investment being adjusted for inflation, i.e. the
expected inflation rate. Hence, expected inflation can be calculated by taking the difference
between return on regular treasury bills and the return on the TIPS. Moreover, not only
governments offer the added security of adjusting for inflation. A market for inflation swaps
has also arisen in many countries. Companies and investors wanting to protect themselves
against inflation can pay a fixed rate to a securities provider, and get paid the actual inflation
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rate in return. The fixed rate is called the break-even rate, as the market price for the swap
will be expected inflation. If inflation turns out to be what expected inflation was, the buyer
of the swap breaks even on his investment. Markets for inflation swaps exist in Great Britain,
Japan, the Euro area, and in the US. Norway has to date no market for inflation swaps, nor
does the Norwegian government issue inflation-indexed bonds. As a result, Norway does not
have a market-based measure of inflation expectations.
5.2 Survey measures of inflation expectations
Surveys are an important source of information for measuring inflation expectations, as
one may potentially get a direct measure of expectations instead of having to derive them
from spreads between financial market instruments. They are mainly performed by asking
a large number of respondents standardized questions about their expectations of one or
more variables, repeated at fixed intervals. As with other empirical methods, the aim of
a survey investigation is to obtain a random sample of the target population in order to
generalize the findings in the sample to the whole population. While surveys can be more
qualitative in its questioning and have a probing, open-ended character, purely quantitative
versions have been dominant in the economics literature. Inflation expectations surveys fall
in a middling category, as it is hard to be certain if the interviewer and the interviewee
interpret the questions the same way, and the sought-after answers are not objective facts.
The challenge of how to operationalize the variables of interest into questions suitable for
a questionnaire, and whether the answers have validity as actual expectations, has been
shown considerable interest.
One interpretation of validity is whether the survey data can actually help forecast future
inflation. The predictive power of expectations measured by surveys has been investigated by
Mehra (2002), who considers inflation expectations and realized inflation to be cointegrated,
moving together in the long run. In the short run, serially correlated forecast errors might
make the variables drift apart. The fact that inflation and inflation expectations move
together means that the development of expectations could give clues as to how actual
inflation will develop. Tests for Granger-causality reveal that the survey forecasts have a
forward-looking component with some predictive power for inflation.21 The tests of whether
21Granger causality entails that lagged values of one value “cause” present values of another variable.
Granger (1980) required that past values of X have unique information about the future values of Y for X
to cause Y . The usefulness of this concept lies in that it variables that Granger-cause another variable can
be used to forecast the caused variable.
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the forecasts are unbiased give mixed results, varying across surveys and time periods.
In the literature, the most widely used survey is the University of Michigan’s Survey
Research Center’s survey of Consumers, commonly referred to as the Michigan Survey. It
is based on a random selection of 500 American households, and is carried out monthly.22
The sample is rotating, i.e. about 60 percent of the respondents from one round is retained
in the next, while the rest is replaced. The respondents are asked about their estimate for
a price increase of the “things you buy” (Curtin, 1996).
Table 1: Inflation expectations surveys
Name (link) Frequency Origin Description
University of Michigan Consumer Survey
(http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/)
Monthly 1959 Rotating sample. Targets house-
holds in the US. Highest Forecast
Horizon (HFH) 5 years
The Survey of Professional Forecasters
(https://www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/)
Quarterly 1981 Avg. sample size 45. Tar-
gets Professional forecasters in
the US. HFH 10 years
The Livingston Survey
(https://www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/)
semi-
annually
1946 Informal survey. Targets
Economists in academia, Fi-
nance and government. HFH 1
year
The ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment
(http://www.zew.de/en/publikationen/
Konjunkturerwartun-
gen/Konjunkturerwartungen.php3)
Monthly 1991 Qualitative survey. Most respon-
dents based in Germany. Tar-
gets professional forecasters in
Finance. HFH 6 months
The European Commission Consumer Survey
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/
db indicators/surveys/index en.htm)
Monthly 1985 Qualitative survey. Representa-
tive sample from each EU coun-
try. Targets Households in Eu-
rope. HFH 1 year
Consensus Forecasts
(http://www.consensuseconomics.com/
download/G7 Economic Forecasts.htm)
Monthly/
Quarterly
/semian-
nually
1989 Varying sample size, forecast-
ers from industrial countries.
Targets Professional forecasters.
HFH 10 years. (semiannually)
BoE NOP Inflation Attitudes Survey
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publica-
tions/Pages/other/nop.aspx)
Quarterly 2002 Also asked about support for and
understanding of monetary pol-
icy. Targets Households. HFH 5
years
Norges Bank Forventningsundersøkelse
(http://www.norges-bank.no/Publisert/ Pub-
likasjoner/Forventningsundersokelse/)
Quarterly 2002 Households asked about forecast
of general level of prices. Tar-
gets households, firms, forecast-
ers. HFH 5 years
There are several surveys that include inflation expectations in Norway. Noteworthy
22Between 1959 and 1977, the survey was carried out quarterly.
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examples include one that Norges Bank directs at households, professional forecasters and
participants in centralized wage bargaining. The survey is performed quarterly, and dates
back to the first quarter of 2002. The respondents are asked about, among other things, what
their forecast of price and wage inflation over different horizons. Furthermore, the Norges
Bank Regional Network of businesses also provide information about their expectations for
future inflation indirectly, through their responses regarding their outlooks for employment,
production and own prices.23 Moreover, Statistics Norway conducts Konjunkturbarometeret,
which has a similar purpose as Norges Bank’s regional network.24 Table 1 lists the most
important international surveys that include inflation expectations, and also the main survey
for Norway.
There is some indication that the inflation expectations of businesses can be inferred from
those of households, evidence for this is found by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013). As is
elaborated in their discussion about expectation formation process, however, this should not
be taken as evidence that there is a causal relationship from consumers’ expectations to those
of businesses or professional forecasters. This is examined in Carroll (2003), where regression
results from the sticky-information model show that the SPF forecast (survey targeting
professionals, see table 1) Granger-causes the Michigan Survey forecast (survey targeting
households), but not the other way around. Carroll (2003) also shows in a horse-race
regression that the SPF has more predictive power for inflation than the Michigan survey
does, when they are used as predictors separately.25 When both are used as predictors at the
same time, the Michigan survey loses its predictive power, while that of the SPF remains.
Past inflation is used as a control, so the statistical significance of the SPF predictor satisfies
the requirements of Granger-causality, i.e. that the survey contains unique information
about the future development of inflation. The results in Carroll (2003) hence suggest that
forecasters surveyed do not simply extrapolate past inflation into the future, as they would
if their expectations were backward-looking. This, together with the fact that the SPF
estimates have lower mean squared error than the Michigan survey, is taken as evidence
that the responses in the SPF are more rational than those in the Michigan Survey.
By contrast, Mehra (2002) finds that the Michigan survey performs better than the SPF,
23The Regional Network comprises 300 businesses, municipals and organizations, and makes up a rep-
resentative sample of the production side in Norway. The reports can be accessed at http://www.norges-
bank.no/Publisert/Publikasjoner/Regionalt-nettverk/
24Konjunkturbarometeret records production volumes in industry and mining. It can be accessed here
https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=KBarTendenser&KortNavnWeb=kbar&PLanguage=0&checked=true
25The Horse race regression is simply assessing which forecast has the most explanatory power when
future inflation is regressed on them separately and together.
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especially in the 80s and 90s, when the Michigan survey provides unbiased and efficient
responses. In this period, the SPF respondents overestimated inflation, which gave biased,
inefficient expectations. As these two examples show, there is disagreement about what
should be considered the appropriate measure of inflation expectations in the economy. In
the next section, I discuss some methodological issues pertaining to survey expectations
which might explain some of the divergence between the inflation expectations measures.
5.3 Evaluating Survey data using experiments
The usefulness of survey measures of expectations to policy makers hinges on the valid-
ity of the responses to actual expectations and behavior. In the methodology literature,
distinctions have been made between different validity concepts.
External validity refers to whether the results from an experiment can be generalized
to the population at large. In the social sciences, one rarely finds simple, unambiguous
relationships between variables, but to make experiments practicable, the phenomenon that
is attempted repoduced must be simplified. This limits the degree to which experimental
results can be expected to hold in the messier real world. In scientific studies, statistical
methods, such as randomization, are used to control for possible confounding variables.
Internal validity concerns whether the conclusions drawn from experiments are war-
ranted. In experiments, internal validity entails that the observed experimental effect can
be attributed to the experimental stimulus (Campbell, 1957). Internal validity is therefore
most relevant in experimental settings where a clear treatment is administered, and has less
relevance for survey research, where no treatment is given.26 There is often assumed to be
a trade-off between external and internal validity, since simplified experiments are needed
to identify causal effects (Jimenez-Buedo & Miller, 2010).
For surveys, however, the most relevant validity measure is construct validity, i.e. that
the measurement device that is used actually measures what it is supposed to. Surveys rely
on the researcher and the respondent understanding the questions in the same way, which is
a major concern as much research aided by survey data concerns social constructs which give
different associations to different people. Survey questions can have multiple interpretations
if the researcher has not taken enough care. For example, questions about inflation expecta-
tions that ask for “the expected rise in the general price level” do not make clear which prices
26Parallels to econometric estimation is the quality that estimators are unbiased and consistent, which
ensures that the relationship between variables is measured accurately.
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are in question, and how they should be weighted. Research using experiments to evalu-
ate survey measures of inflation expectations have taken different approaches to investigate
whether construct and internal validity is intact. Some of them I will broach below, namely
the issue of (i) whether incentives are set up to assure accurate responses in surveys, (ii)
that question wording ensures correspondence between the variable being measured and the
interpretation of the respondents, (iii) how providing information as part of the surveying
affects answers, (iv) how surveys can capture resondents’ uncertainty about their answers,
and (v) how answers depend on respondents’ knowledge about how economic variables move
in relation to each other. First, efforts have been made to clarify whether responses depend
on incentives, since the effort involved in forming a expectation is significant. Most people
do not think about inflation all the time, and might not have a well-formed expectation.
There is a worry that in the absence of incentives, survey respondents will not expend the
energy necessary to consider relevant information in order to form an inflation expectation.
In one experiment conducted by Armantier et al. (2011), respondents are asked what their
inflation expectations are, and subsequently asked to make an investment decision where
the outcome depends on the realized inflation rate. In the second stage, participants have
clear incentives to state their true expectation.27 To a large degree, the respondent act
like expected utility maximizers, responding to the incentives they are given. However, a
close correspondence was found between the expectation stated when not given incentives,
and that stated when giving the true expectation was incentivized, calming the worry that
respondents won’t give up their true expectations unless incentivized. The experiment also
reveals that people pay attention to expected inflation when making investment, at least in
the experimental setting. Investment decisions in the real world are based on more than the
expected inflation rate, however, such as the discount rate and liquidity constraints, so it is
difficult to say whether the agents’ behavior in the experiment could be generalized.
Second, different question wording may give rise to different results, implying that the
validity of surveys is sensitive to which questions are asked. The reason for this worry is that
many survey measures, especially for households, report expectations that are systematically
higher than actual inflation for prolonged periods of time. Surveys designed to measure
inflation expectations among households intentionally use simplified language because the
27The respondents are asked to choose between two lotteries, one that gives an amount in real terms
with certainty, or an amount that relates negatively to the rate of inflation. By sequentially increasing the
amount given with certainty, they find the respondents’ switching point, where the expected value of the
safe bet is equal to the expectation of the bet depending on the inflation rate. The expected value of the
last bet depends on the probabilities the respondents assign to different rates of inflation.
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subject is technical and not expected to be common knowledge. There is, however, reason
to believe that simplification is counter-productive. de Bruin, Van der Klaauw, et al. (2010)
show that asking about “the rate of inflation” indeed elicits lower responses than when asking
for the expected rise in “prices in general”, closer to the actual CPI inflation. The terms are
notionally the same, but may evoke different associations in the minds of the respondents
who tend to focus more on the prices on goods and services that they typically buy when
asked about “prices in general”, than when asked about “inflation”. The prices that have
shown the most variability in recent times might be most salient to the respondents. The
prediction dispersion is also lower when asking about inflation directly, rather than prices in
general (de Bruin, Van der Klaauw, et al., 2010), which is another indication that simpler
wording leads to more confusion. These findings are in line with other research in the field
of survey design, where it has been shown that seemingly irrelevant wording differences give
rise to different answers.28
Third, the question of how respondents update their beliefs when provided with new
information has attracted attention. Being provided with information affects the cost that
respondents incur when they form an inflation expectation. In an experiment designed to
see how respondents revise their expectations in response to new information, Armantier
et al. (2012) include a control group that is not provided with the accurate information,
but nonetheless asked for their inflation expectations. By comparing the answers of the
group getting information with the control group, a clean estimate of the effect of providing
information is provided.
Fourth, concern has been raised that survey measures of expectations and experiments
do not capture individuals’ uncertainty about outcomes. The uncertainty in inflation expec-
tations is a highly relevant metric for central banks, as it gives an indication of sentiment in
the economy, and of the credibility of a monetary policy that aims for price stability, but it
is not clear how to measure such uncertainty. Surveys asking for point estimates suffer from
the disadvantage that only aggregate uncertainty can be extracted from the data. Using the
dispersion of point estimates for inflation expectations has not been proven a good proxy for
actual inflation uncertainty (de Bruin, Potter, et al., 2010). By instead asking for a range
with assigned probabilities, individuals’ uncertainty can be directly measured. de Bruin
28For example, people are more likely to endorse a proposal to “not allow” something than they are to
“forbid it” (Holleman, 1999). Respondents are also more eg.often to willingly participate in a hypothetical
medical experiment where the “success rate is 95 %”, than they are when “the risk of adverse effects is 5
%” (Linville et al., 1993).
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et al. (2011) ask respondents for probability densities of inflation expectations, and they
uncover heterogeneities between individuals that might be explained by financial responsi-
bilities and literacy. Uncertainty also hit a high during the financial crisis among the more
financially literate respondents, when many reported a wider range for their expectations.
The results they find with this approach are consistent with inflation expectations from
surveys asking only for a point estimate, suggesting that the added complexity of assigning
probability to different outcomes is not overly daunting for the respondents.
Finally, a precondition for ascribing forecasting value to surveys targeting the wide pop-
ulation is that respondents have a reasonable understanding of how monetary policy works.
Carvalho and Nechio (2014) look at whether the answers in the Michigan Survey are con-
sistent with a Taylor rule for the monetary policy. Respondents who expect reduced unem-
ployment and higher inflation should expect the policy rate to increase as well. The authors
find that US households seem to understand monetary policy well, although results differ
based on education and income. There also seems to be a better understanding of monetary
policy in times when labor market conditions are weak, suggesting that heightened focus on
economic issues in the news make households more aware of these principles. In a related
study, Schmidt and Nautz (2010) examine whether experts’ interest rate forecasts differ
from realized policy rates because their expectations for inflation and output are off the
mark, or if it is because they do not understand the central bank’s decision. The authors
utilize survey responses given by finance market experts about their expectations for various
economic variables, and find that the experts consistently overestimate the ECB’s response
to increased inflation. However, since the ECB clarified its strategy in 2003, the experts’
forecasts moved closer to actual policy. This suggests that clearer communication should
be a prioritized goal for central banks, which goes hand in hand with building credibility
in order to anchor inflation expectations on target. In the period after the financial crisis,
inflation targeting central banks have been concerned with financial imbalances as part of
their policy actions. If they are not successful in communicating that their main target,
namely inflation, is not abandoned, it could hurt their credibility and reduce the efficacy of
monetary policy instruments.
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6 Empirical analysis of Norwegian survey data
In the remaining parts of this thesis, I evaluate some of the theoretical predictions about
the behavior of Norwegian inflation expectations using data sets collected through surveys.
I approach this evaluation in three ways. First, in this section, I conduct a survey with 1052
respondents to examine how much knowledge ordinary households possess about inflation,
the processes that determine inflation, and their understanding of the link between inflation
and monetary policy, in order to find out how reasonable the theoretical assumptions made
about economic agents in the literature are. Second, in section 7, I investigate whether
inflation expectations are accurate in their predictions or not. There, I especially rely on
methods similar to those used in Mehra (2002),29 and utilize the repeated survey that
Norges Bank has developed to measure inflation expectations in Norway. Based on this
data, I estimate a VAR containing inflation forecasts and realized inflation. By doing this,
I am able uncover whether inflation forecasts contain information about future inflation to
a greater extent than what is contained in past inflation, which would imply that agents
are forward-looking, incorporating other information in their expectations formation than
extrapolating past inflation. Third, in section 8, I try to uncover relationships between the
expectations of different agent groups. In order to determine which groups to consider more
reliable when using survey data to forecast inflation. I make use of the model developed by
Carroll (2003)30, which explicates this proposition and makes suggestions as to what kinds
of relationships it is natural to search for.
6.1 How much do households know about inflation?
In order to get a better impression of Norwegian households’ inflation expectations, I have
designed a survey that was extended to a representative sample of Norwegian individuals.
The questions concern the knowledge of the individuals about recent events that affects the
Norwegian economy, and also a direct question about whether they seek out information
about the economy deliberately. These questions are meant to shed light on the information-
seeking habits of individuals, which would be extensive in the case that they are rational
utility maximizers who seek to react optimally to any change in economic circumstances.
The interviews were conducted by InFact on April 8th 2015, over telephone using automated
29Mehra’s (2002) approach and results are referenced in section 5.2
30This model is described in section 4.
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questions and pre-defined response alternatives.31 1052 individuals over the age of 18 were
interviewed in total, with a median age of 46. The questions are as follows: (i) How often do
you follow news about the economy? (ii) Which of these five alternatives32 do you think will
impact the Norwegian economy the most in 2015? (iii) CPI inflation in 2014 was 2 percent,
do you think it will be, higher than, lower than, or the same as this in 2015? (iv) Can you
explain what inflation is? (v) What happens to inflation when Norges bank reduces the
interest rate?33
The first two questions serve the dual purpose of getting a measure of how informed
respondents are, and to prepare them for the questions that follow. The third question,
concerning the respondents beliefs about future inflation, is styled similarly as in frequently
used household surveys. The average inflation expectation measure that is taken out of
these surveys hides the fact that individuals have widely differing beliefs about the econ-
omy. Seeing this question in relationship with the others in my survey, however, can provide
insights into how much resources individuals invest in gathering the information on which
they base their prediction, which in aggregate will determine the informational content of
an inflation expectations average collected from surveys. The less individuals are informed
about developments in the economy, the more uncertain their forecasts are likely to be,
and the wider will be the distribution of the individual responses. If most economic deci-
sions, which in aggregate determine inflation, are made using heuristics and rules-of-thumb,
while individuals possess limited amounts of information about developments on a macro
level, the ability of inflation expectation surveys of households to forecast inflation could be
questioned.
Questions four and five delve further into the issue of whether people understand what
inflation means, and the central bank’s role in the mechanisms that determine what inflation
will be. That people have an understanding of how the central bank intervenes with its policy
tools to ensure stable economic growth is central to their understanding of how inflation
develops in the face of economic shocks such as the oil price decline.
31Because the interviews are conducted by playing voice-recordings of the questions, I believe the chance
that some respondents have answered the questions incorrectly on purpose is large. If this is the case, the
resulting measurement error will decrease the accuracy of any conclusions I can draw from the data, but
hopefully the errors are not systematical, meaning the data suggests misleading relationships.
321. The exchange rate. 2. The oil price. 3. Unemployment. 4. Wage growth. 5. Inflation.
33The original formulation of the questions in Norwegian is contained in the Appendix.
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6.2 Results
In the following, I will analyze the survey responses one question at a time, cross-referencing
with other questions where relevant.
Question 1. Do you occasionally read news on economic events?
Table 2: How often do you read news on economic events?
Answers No Monthly or less Weekly Daily Unsure Total
Frequency 281 308 240 149 74 1052
Percent 26.6 % 29.2 % 22.8 % 14.1 % 7 % 100 %
As expected, how frequently people update themselves on economic events varies greatly.
Depending on their interests and financial responsibilities, people feel that developments in
the economy affects their life to a lesser or greater degree. About 65 percent percent of
the respondents say they follow the news less than once per month, or never, see table
2. Although a majority of Norwegians pick up a newspaper every day, follow the news on
the internet, radio or television (Statistics Norway, 2015), the news that concern economic
events seemingly reach only a smaller audience. Considering that reports about the economy
are mainly confined to niche newspapers and finance sections of the largest subscription
newspapers, while local newspapers are what most readers pick up, this is not very surprising.
Especially with the advent of the internet as a news source, media consumption has become
increasingly selective, and consumers will not seek out information that is not in their
interest. The share of respondents who say they follow news about economic events at all
increases with age, up to 65 years, see table 3. While about the same share of respondents
between 18-29 years and 30-44 years follow the economics news daily, the share doubles for
the age group 45-64 years.
Table 3: Respondents to question 1 by age groups
18-29 yrs 30-44 yrs 45-64 yrs +65 yrs
Follow news at Count 132 182 255 128
least monthly % of age group 60.7% 66.3% 74.7% 58.7%
Follow news daily Count 24 24 70 31
(included above) % of age group 11.0 % 8.7 % 20.7 % 14.3 %
Acknowledging that not all households in the economy do not find it worthwhile to
inform themselves about economic developments does not imply that agents are not at all
rational in their decision making, as it is costly to acquire information that might only
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be of marginal value in economic decision making processes, and information needed to
make sound long-term decision does not require daily updating. The notion that aggregate
outcomes in the economy will reflect that all agents in the economy are rational, however, is
harder to uphold. Furthermore, if people are not particularly informed about the economy,
it is a stretch to consider their average inflation expectations to be a good forecast of future
inflation, as previously mentioned.
Question 2. Which of the following will have the largest effect on the Norwegian
economy in 2015?
When asked which will be most important of the exchange rate, the oil price, unemployment,
wage growth, or inflation, a large share of the respondents picked the oil price as the most
important factor.
Table 4: Which of these alternatives do you think will affect Norway’s economy the most in
2015?
Answers Exch. rate Oil price Unemp. Wage gr. Inflation Unsure Total
Frequency 96 403 202 62 28 261 1052
Percent 9.1 % 38.3 % 19.2 % 5.9 % 2.7 % 24.8 % 100 %
The dramatic decline in the oil price is the event that have attracted the most attention
in the news in the early part of 2015, prominently featuring in the ensuing discussion about
what the consequences for the Norwegian economy in the short and long term will be, see
table 4. That the share who are concerned that unemployment will be an important factor
for the economy is large is surprising, given that unemployment is very low at the moment.
Although unemployment has increased in some industries, it is not likely to become a major
concern or affect a large part of the population. What will affect a large share of people,
on the other hand, is lower wage growth than what has been the norm in previous years.
The lower wage growth is likely to result from the diminished activity and demand in the
economy, and will be felt at the aggregate level, but might not be dramatic enough for
people to be worried about their personal economy. The low share that chose inflation or
the exchange rate probably reflects that the present development of these variables has few
adverse effects on the Norwegian economy, but it could be expected that some might have
picked up that low inflation internationally has been problematized.
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Question 3. Will the change in CPI be higher, lower or the same in 2015
compared to 2014?
Table 5: The growth in CPI was 2 % in 2014, do you think it will be higher, lower, or the
same in 2015?
Answers Higher Lower The same Don’t know Total
Frequency 307 213 335 197 1052
Percent 29.2 % 20.2 % 31.9 % 18.8 % 100 %
This question concerns the respondents’ inflation expectations for the year 2015, and is
posed similarly to questions frequently used in household surveys. Because of the interview
method used, the data is categorical, meaning numerical expectations could not be measured.
Instead, the respondents were given information about what the CPI growth was in 2014 (2
%), and asked whether they thought inflation would be (i) lower than, (ii) higher than, or (iii)
the same in 2015. My main interest in this section is to analyze how well informed individuals
are about recent economic developments and what this means for the prospect of measuring
inflation expectations using surveys targeting regular households. In the following, I will
therefore evaluate the precision of the responses given in table 5, against other expectations
measures and recent events that will influence monetary policy decisions and the business
cycle. In July 2014, the oil price started a rapid decline from a stable, high level of over
$100 per barrel. Oil production makes up a significant portion of Norwegian exports, and
although oil producers will still operate with a profit, and the public sector is insulated
against the fall in tax revenue because of the channeling of oil revenue through Norway’s
sovereign wealth fund, the price decline is nevertheless expected to slow the Norwegian
economy due to lower demand for oil related services, such as prospecting for oil fields and
development of new production capacity. In December 2014, Norges Bank reacted to the oil
price decline with cutting the policy interest rate with 25 basis points. The central bank has
given strong signals that the policy rate will be cut further, but surprised markets in March
2015 by postponing the expected reduction from the already low level of 1.25 percent. Norges
Bank’s judgement was that the oil price decline had not yet manifested itself in dramatically
weaker demand in the economy, and a rate cut was not justified. Norges Bank has not taken
a future rate cut off the table however, if the current situation persists. The expected
decrease in the policy interest rate speaks in favor of higher inflation in 2015 than in 2014.
So does the depreciation of Norwegian Kroner against all major currencies, which means
imported inflation should be higher. On the other hand, prospects of lower wage growth
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and a lower level of activity than before should push inflation down. The effect of recent
events on inflation for 2015 is therefore not entirely clear.
Inflation expectations over the next 12 months among economic experts, business exec-
utives and labor organizations, measured in the first quarter of 2015, are 2.3, 2.4, and 2.2
percent respectively.34 These groups hence agree that inflation will be higher in 2015 than
in 2014, but slightly below target. In the first quarter of 2014, they were 2.1, 2.3, and 2.2
percent respectively.
In my survey data, presented in table 5 respondents disagree whether inflation will be
higher than (29.2 %), the same as (31.8 %), or lower than (20,2 %) it was in 2014. Opinions
are relatively evenly spread over the two former, which consume about 60 percent of the
sample, and which are most in line with the experts and business leaders asked in the Epinion
survey.
Table 6: Cross-tabulation of inflation beliefs and reading news
CPI-Inflation in 2014 was 2 %, what will it be in 2015?
Higher Lower The same Unsure Total
Do you No 33.6 % (94) 11.8 % (33) 26.5 % (74) 28.2 % (79) 100 % (280)
occasion- Monthly 30.4 % (94) 17.2 % (53) 34.7 % (107) 17.7 % (55) 100 % (308)
ally fol- Weekly 29.8 % (71) 26.4 % (63) 34.4 % (82) 9.5 % (23) 100 % (240)
low news Daily 21.2 % (32) 36.4 % (54) 35.6 % (53) 6.8 % (10) 100 % (149)
on the Unsure 21.8 % (16) 11.9 % (9) 24.9 % (18) 41.4 % (31) 100 % (74)
economy? Total 29.2 % (307) 20.2 % (212) 31.9 % (334) 18.8 % (198) 100 % (1052)
Table 6 shows the proportion of respondents with varying beliefs about the future path of
inflation separated based on informedness. The likelihood that someone thinks inflation will
be higher in 2015 than it was in 2014 seems to decrease the more informed that person is.
Equivalently, the share of people who think inflation will be lower increases the more often
they read news about the economy. Pearson’s χ2 rejects independence between informedness
and inflation expectations with a high degree of significance (χ2 = 105, 91).35 The reason
for this could be that less informed respondents confuse CPI inflation with the price level,
which will be higher next year as long as inflation is positive. This could make more people
answer that CPI inflation will be higher in 2015 than 2014 even though they might be of
the opinion that the price level will increase with less than 2 percent.
34From Forventningsundersøkelsen conducted by Epinion by Norges Bank: http://static.norges-
bank.no/pages/102756/forventningsundersokelse q1 2015.pdf?v=26022015100557
35Pearson’s χ2 is a test used on categorical data to examine whether the differences in observed distribution
when controlling for another variable is because of random variation of if it is systematical. The test statistic
is χ2 =
∑
i
(Oi−Ei)2
Ei
, where Oi is the observed frequency, while Oi is the expected frequency.
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The feature that the most informed individuals are more likely to expect inflation to go
down seems to go counter to the experts’ beliefs about how recent events will affect inflation.
It could be that the news about lower levels of activity in the Norwegian economy is what
has caught people’s attention, because the effects of a lower oil price on wage growth is what
is most frequently reported in the news. The effect of the central bank’s reaction to this
development on inflation, on the other hand, is not so straightforward and obvious, and is
not something people relate to personally as they do with wage growth. The next questions
that I asked address this issue.
Question 4. Can you explain what inflation is?
The degree of knowledge about inflation dynamics might also explain part of people’s uncer-
tainty about what inflation will be in the future, found in the results from the last question
discussed. This potential confusion might stem from a lacking understanding of the concept
of inflation, the extent of which I want to measure with the current question. The respon-
dents are asked to choose between three alternative definitions of inflation: price growth,
price growth that is higher than normal, or the printing of money. Almost 40 percent of
the respondents answer that they think inflation means a higher price growth than normal,
whereas 35 percent chose the correct definition of inflation which is simply price growth, see
table 7:36
Table 7: Can you explain what inflation is?
Answers Printing money Price growth Price g. above normal Don’t know Total
Frequency 92 366 402 192 1053
Percent 8.7 % 34.7 % 38.2 % 18.3 % 100 %
Only about 9 percent answered “printing money” when asked about what inflation is,
which implies respondents are able to distinguish between inflation and what causes it in
special circumstances, such as during the most famous episodes of hyperinflation.
In table 8, respondents who choose different definitions of inflation are divided based on
how often they follow news about the economy. The share of people who pick the correct
definition of inflation increases with how often they read news about the economy. Pearson’s
χ2 also here suggests that this variation is not due to chance (χ2 = 116, 7).
36Technically, the correct definition of inflation is “sustained price growth”, but in order to concentrate
on the difference between just price growth and price growth higher than normal (hyperinflation), the
alternatives were made more concise.
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Table 8: Cross-tabulation of knowledge about inflation and reading news
Can you explain what inflation means?
Printing money Price growth Price g.
above norm
Don’t know Total
Do you No 8.5 % (24) 27.2 % (76) 33.3 % (93) 31.0 % (87) 100 % (281)
occasion- Monthly 8.4 % (26) 31.8 % (98) 42.5 % (131) 17.2 % (53) 100 % (308)
ally fol- Weekly 10.9 % (26) 38.4 % (92) 43.9 % (105) 6.8 % (16) 100 % (240)
low news Daily 6.5 % (10) 58.6 % (88) 28.3 % (42) 6.7 % (10) 100 % (149)
on the Unsure 8.3 % (6) 15.4 % (11) 40.5 % (30) 35.7 % (26) 100 % (74)
economy? Total 8.7 % (92) 34.7 % (366) 38.2 % (402) 18,3 % (193) 100 % (1052)
Among the most informed, respondents who follow news about the economy daily, 58.1
percent think inflation means the general increase in prices. There seems to be a divide
between respondents who read news about the economy daily, and people who read news
less often, as the share who answers correctly increases by quite a lot when going from
one group to another. The mistaken belief that inflation refers only to periods where the
price level increases more than normal could spring from the highly popularized photos of
heaps of paper money during the hyperinflation of Germany after the First World War, or
the more recent hyperinflation in Zimbabwe which reached its peak in 2008 at 231,000,000
percent (The Economist, 2013). Inflation which is on a level that doesn’t distort economic
decisions and gives agents reasonable predictability is what should be associated with ‘low
inflation.’ Inflation targets of 2 - 2.5 percent fall within this definition. As opposed to
hyperinflations, the less dramatic phenomenon of low inflation is something many people
might not pay particularly close attention to. This is such a common oversight that a term
has been coined for it, namely money illusion. The term refers to people’s tendency to think
of amounts of money in nominal terms, disregarding price changes that occur over time that
change the purchasing power of money. However, people who suffer from money illusion
might recognize the concept of inflation if they are reminded of it, such as in this survey,
or if inflation is high. Alternatively, they might not understand it, which is understandable
seeing as inflation is a rather technical term. Research has shown that people easily confuse
economic concepts, for instance taking an increase in labor supply to mean that more unfilled
jobs are available (Strandgaard & Andersen, 2015).
Question 5: What effect would a reduction in interest rates have on inflation?
Central banks with an inflation target mainly use one or more policy interest rates to in-
fluence inflation in the desired direction. Lowering the policy rate leads to lower market
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interest rates, which makes it more attractive for consumers to spend money now rather
than later, and for businesses to make investments, thereby increasing activity in the econ-
omy. In theory, this leads to higher inflation as businesses increase their prices in line with
the higher demand, and workers increase their wage demands as unemployment is reduced.
A reinforcing effect goes through the exchange rate in small, open countries like Norway,
as investments shifts out of the country and the Krone depreciates, making imports more
expensive. A lower policy interest rate therefore corresponds to higher inflation. The re-
sponses to question 5 can be seen as a test of the respondents’ understanding of monetary
policy. The result indicates that the way monetary policy works is not properly understood
by everyone, see table 9:
Table 9: If Norges Bank lowers the interest rate, what happens to inflation?
Unchanged Increases Decreases Don’t know Total
Frequency 93 366 214 379 1052
Percent 8.9 % 34.8 % 20.3 % 36 % 100 %
Only 34.8 percent of respondents answer correctly that inflation will go up if the policy
rate is lowered.37 A whole 36 percent of the respondents answer that they don’t know what
will happen, indicating that they do not feel knowledgeable enough about the subject to
guess at what will happen. Even among respondents who read news about the economy daily,
42.3 % of the respondents get this question wrong, as can be seen in table 10 (Pearson’s χ2
is 99.27, indicating results are not random). The share that answers correctly does however
increase with the frequency of following news on economic events. The share who answers
that they are unsure shows a particularly large decrease.
Table 10: Cross-tabulation of monetary policy understanding and reading news
If Norges Bank lowers the interest rate, what happens to inflation?
Unchanged Increases Decreases Unsure Total
Do you No 9.2 % (26) 24.3 % (68) 17.2 % (48) 49.3 % (138) 100 % (281)
occasion- Monthly 8.8 % (27) 34.1 % (105) 24.2 % (75) 32.9 % (101) 100 % (308)
ally fol- Weekly 10.0 % (24) 39.4 % (95) 22.9 % (55) 27.7 % (67) 100 % (240)
low news Daily 7.1 % (11) 57.7 % (86) 18.5 % (28) 16.7 % (25) 100 % (149)
on the Unsure 7.5 % (6) 16.5 % (12) 11.7 % (9) 64.3 % (48) 100 % (74)
economy? Total 8.9 % (93) 34.8 % (366) 20.3 % (214) 36.0 % (379) 100 % (1052)
In sum, the responses gathered through this survey suggest that a large share of indi-
37Which answer is correct does depend on whether the question is interpreted as what would happen
according to economic theory, or what happens in reality. In the latter case, there might not be a clear-cut
answer. People’s recent experience with low inflation in Norway and internationally, while interest rates are
also low, provides experiences which can go counter to what economic theory predicts.
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viduals are not particularly well informed about developments in the economy, based on
the frequency with which they update themselves on news about the economy. The mech-
anisms determining inflation also seem to be not very well understood. If this is true of
the population as a whole, and not just a feature of my sample, it does not bode well for
the prospects of extracting useful inflation forecasts from households. In the next section, I
will look at exactly this, namely how much information about future inflation can be drawn
out of households’ inflation expectations, if any. I will also examine whether the inflation
expectations of households are rational, and if there are other groups that are better at
forecasting inflation.
7 How rational are survey expectations?
In the literature, good forecasts based on expectations require that expectations are ratio-
nal, i.e. that all relevant available information about the economy is incorporated in the
forecast. The degree of rationality in observed data is a question of how well agents can
actually predict future inflation. Rational expectations would manifest themselves in an ob-
servable relationship between expectations and actual inflation. If expectations are rational,
predictions should not make systematic errors about the future development in inflation. A
finding that observed inflation expectations are good predictors of realized inflation would
make them a valuable tool for policymakers and other agents in the economy who take
interest in what the inflation rate will be.
In this section, I evaluate the survey data on inflation expectations from Norway, using
various criteria, to examine their ability to predict inflation. I start with some descriptive
evidence, and then go on to more technical evaluators.
7.1 Data and stylized facts
The inflation expectations data for Norway is mainly contained in a quarterly survey de-
signed by Norges bank, and conducted by Epinion AS to gauge the expectations of different
groups in the Norwegian economy.38 A sample of households, economists, business ex-
ecutives, and labor organizations are asked separately about their inflation expectations
at different horizons. I will pay special attention to the expectations of households and
38Norges Banks Forventningsundersøkelse – http://www.norges-bank.no/Publisert/Publikasjoner/ For-
ventningsundersokelse/. The survey was earlier conducted by Opinion Perduco/Opinion (2009-2014), and
TNS Gallup (2002-2008).
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economists, as the theory described give these a central role. In the survey, households are
first asked a couple of questions about how they think prices on goods and services have
developed in the past 12 months. Next, they are asked by how many percent they think
prices will change in the next 12 months. Households are further asked what they think the
increase in prices will be in “two to three years”, which gives information on longer horizon
expectations. Economists, business executives and labor organizations are asked about their
forecast of the yearly inflation rate one, two, and five years ahead.
In this section, I utilize various measures of inflation to evaluate the rationality of inflation
expectations. Different measures of inflation include different price elements, some of which
are more volatile and depend more on market conditions in the world economy than others.
The most commonly used inflation inflation measure is (i) the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
which measures the price of a weighted bundle of goods, usually indexed to a reference year
for the country in question. Removing specific elements give measures of inflation that are
more stable over time. (ii) CPI-ATE is based on the CPI, but excludes energy prices and
changes in product taxes. (iii) CPI-ATE-IMP covers the prices on imported goods and
services, while (iv) CPI-ATE-I is the component of CPI-ATE that comes from domestically
produced goods and services. Another, more general way of decomposing the consumer
price index is to separate it into one index containing prices that change more frequently
than the median, and another index containing the prices that change less frequently than
the median (Erlandsen, 2014), the latter which I will call (v) CPI STICKY. I will evaluate
the rationality of survey expectations against all these inflation measures.
Survey response data was accessed from opinion.no on March 4th 2015. (i), (ii) and (iii)
was accessed from SSB on March 11th 2015. These series are monthly 12-month growth.
To get quarterly numbers I averaged the values for the months of each quarter. (iv) was
collected from the data attachements of Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy Report. (v) was
generously provided by Solveig Erlandsen. All price index data are measured as 12-month
change.39
As can be seen from figure 2, households’ inflation expectations for inflation one year
ahead are generally high throughout the sample, mostly lying above realized inflation and
the inflation target. Average households expectations for the twelve years in the sample is 3
percent, whereas the average actual inflation in the CPI-index was 1.83 percent. Economists
39The CPI-ATE-I time series was gathered in this way: From PP 4/14: 10/2014-1/2010, from PP 2/10:
12/2009-1/2007, from PP 2/07: 12/2006-1/2002.
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in finance and academia have on average been closer in their expectations, with 2.05 percent.
During the same period, Norges Bank has operated with an inflation target of 2.5 percent.
Expectations of labor organizations and firms are also higher than actual inflation at most
instances, mostly hugging the inflation target at 2.5 percent, even though inflation was lower
than that during most of the period. Economists, businesses and labor organizations seem
to have been adjusting their expectations along with inflation somewhat. Whether this is
an adaptation of expectations to past inflation or accurate forecasts remain to be seen.
Figure 2: 1 year ahead inflation expectations and CPI. CPI values are t+4, so that at every point it shows what inflation
will be in the next 12 months, to be comparable with expectations
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There are several possible explanations for this gap between households’ stated expec-
tations and the realized inflation rate. First, it seems likely that what comes to the respon-
dents’ minds when asked about price changes is not the general price change measured by the
CPI, but specific prices that they are familiar with. If these prices have had higher growth
than the growth in CPI, it would explain part of the discrepancy between expectations and
CPI inflation. Figure 3 shows how the different measures of inflation vary from each other.
One thing that sticks out is how low CPI-ATE IMP was during the sample period compared
with the other series. Imported inflation makes up one third of CPI, affecting the level of
this variable considerably. Food and housing services typically produced domestically and
elements of the higher CPI-ATE-I-index, and takes up a large share of households’ budget.
These prices might be more familiar to regular households. Second, it might be that house-
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holds do not form their expectations adaptively, by looking at past realized inflation rates,
but inform themselves by consulting the opinions of experts, who as portrayed by the figure,
have also tended to expect inflation to be higher than what it actually turned out to be.
This fits with the theory of sticky information (see section 3). A third possible explana-
tion, which could be especially important for Norway where a big part of wage bargaining
is conducted centrally, is that households derive their inflation expectations by looking at
increases in the nominal wage level, which is a variable that households are perhaps more
likely to pay attention to. In the years included in the sample, Norwegian households have
seen considerable increases in their real incomes.
Figure 3: 12 month change in inflation – 5 different measures
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Because of the evidence of persistence in inflation discussed in section 2, it is interesting
to first model these series as autoregressive processes. The AR(1)-specification involves
estimating a regression of the form piet = ρpi
e
t−1 + , which captures the variable’s dependence
on its past. For the sample period that I look at, regressing households’ inflation expectations
as an AR(1)-process returns a lag coefficient of 0.98, which is very close to a unit root. If
ρ turns out to be equal to one, can be written as δpiet = , meaning the time series is a
Random walk -process where the disturbances accumulate without dying out, resulting in the
variable not converging to an equilibrium in the long run some empirical research suggests
that these variables might be better characterized as random walks (Ball, Cecchetti, &
Gordon, 1990, Barsky, 1987), which has consequences for inference using these variables.
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Non-stationarity, or integration, renders standard inference methods invalid. Granger and
Newbold (1974) showed that OLS regression on variables that are integrated can lead to
significant relationships even though there are none in reality. It can however be difficult to
distinguish between unit root processes and processes that are highly persistent (Ball et al.,
1990), which inflation expectations clearly is an example of. In the presence of structural
breaks in the data, it might be the case that a highly persistent process is non-stationary
at some intervals, but otherwise stationary. The coefficient is estimated to be close to one,
and the data does not allow me to reject the hypothesis that the ρ-coefficient is equal to
one (p-value of 0.41). I perform tests for stationarity later, in section 8.1, where I find that
households’ and experts’ expectations are likely I(1). Further, testing for autocorrelation
in the residuals from the regression of the AR(1)-formulations shows that serial correlation
has been accounted for by the first order lag. The residuals seem to follow a white noise
process.
7.2 Tests for unbiasedness of survey expectations
To analyze whether expectations can be considered rational, one can estimate a regression
equation like the following,
pit = α + βpi
f
t|t−1 + t (3)
where pit is the actual inflation rate, and pi
f
t is the forecast of inflation in period t, made
in period t-1. If expectations are able to forecast inflation accurately, one would expect that
the constant in this equation is zero, and the coefficient on the expectation equal to one.
Any deviation between expectations and the actual inflation rate would be random, and
captured by the error term t, which is assumed to have zero mean and constant variance
(Grant & Thomas, 1999)
When estimating equation 3 by OLS, the usual null-hypothesis concerning the constant
implies that expectations are not systematically above or below actual inflation. If expec-
tations were rational, non-rejection is what we should expect. Regarding the estimate of
β, non-rejection of a hypothesis that it is equal to one is consistent with rationality. These
hypotheses can be considered jointly using a F-test. If non-rejection is the outcome of the
test, it could rely on at least two explanations. Either the null hypothesis is correct, that
is, the inflation expectation is unbiased, or there is not enough power in the data to reject a
false null hypothesis. If the squared errors from the unrestricted regression on the available
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sample are large, the test result could conclude that imposing the unbiasedness-restriction
is an equally good fit within the limits that statistical uncertainty impose. Statistics such
as the R2 provides information about whether the latter case is the most likely. If the tests
indicate rejection, however, we can be fairly certain that the expectations measures are
biased.
Table 11 presents some error statistics from regression of equation 3, as well as OLS
regression of inflation on past inflation 12 months prior, which would be the most recent
inflation report at the time when the respective groups surveyed made their inflation forecast.
What is reported is the Root Mean Squared Error, i.e. the mean squared error from predicted
values of the dependent varable in the regressions. The numbers in italics are the ratio of
these two statistics, which indicates whether the forecasters or the naive forecast are more
accurate. A ratio below one means the survey measures of inflation contain more information
about future inflation than what extrapolating past inflation does. The economists’ forecast
Table 11: Forecasting Accuracy of Survey Measures of Expected Inflation
CPI CPI-ATE CPI-ATE-IMP CPI-ATE-I CPI-S
Households 1.01 0.75 1.04 0.74 0.68
1.09 1.04 1.09 0.99 1.03
Economists 1.06 0.65 0.93 0.67 0.58
1.15 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.86
Labor org. 1.08 0.72 1.02 0.72 0.6
1.02 1.00 1.06 0.97 0.89
Business exec. 1.06 0.67 0.97 0.61 0.56
1.14 0.92 1.01 0.82 0.83
Naive Forecast 0.93 0.72 0.96 0.74 0.67
Numbers reported are Root Mean Square Error from regression of equation 3. The Naive Forecast is inflation
12 months prior, i.e. an AR(1)-process where the autoregressive component is lagged four quarters. Numbers
in italics are the ratio of RMSE in each regression to RMSE of the naive forecast.
is more accurate for most of the inflation measures than the naive forecast, which is a result
that will reappear later, when discussing the main results from these regressions. What is
also a recurring finding is that the forecasters are generally better able at forecasting the
inflation measure that is composed of domestically produced goods (CPI-ATE-I).
In table 12 are the main results from OLS regression on equation (3), using different
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Table 12: Test of unbiasedness
Households CPI CPI-ATE CPI-ATE-IMP CPI-ATE-I CPI-S
β -.472 .309 .385 .397 .453*
(-1.16) (0.87) (0.79) (1.44) (1.68 )
α 3.188 .524 -1.500 1.125 1.454
(2.84) (0.51) (-1.10) (1.37) (1.81)
Bias-test 29.31*** 58.81*** 192.18*** 14.90*** 4.55
Centered R2 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.08
Experts CPI CPI-ATE CPI-ATE-IMP CPI-ATE-I CPI-S
β .573 1.082*** 1.430*** 1.116*** 1.1678***
(1.29) (3.49) (3.65) (3.01) (4.82)
α .661 -.764 -3.253 .0769 .4230
(0.72) (-1.15) (-3.67) (0.10) (0.90)
Bias-test 1.70 12.85*** 121.79*** 3.72 31.09***
Centered R2 0.03 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.32
Labor org. CPI CPI-ATE CPI-ATE-IMP CPI-ATE-I CPI-S
β -.0146 .484 .660 .6345*** .8664***
(-0.05) (1.30) (1.10) (2.47) (5.48)
α -2.020 .427 -1.729 1.018 .9813
(-3.72) (0.55) (-1.40) (1.95) (3.34 )
Bias-test 10.84*** 12.78*** 98.88*** 4.33 34.89***
Centered R2 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.28
Firms CPI CPI-ATE CPI-ATE-IMP CPI-ATE-I CPI-S
β .524 .8019*** .9917*** 1.074*** .982***
(1.52) (2.71) (2.66) (5.04) (4.19)
α .542 -.527 -2.757 -.2956 .389
(0.69) (-0.77) (-3.03) (-0.59) (0.74)
Bias-test 8.41** 37.36*** 144.18*** 0.98 8.78**
Centered R2 0.04 0.21 0.15 0.368 0.36
t-values in parantheses. Stars indicate significance level, *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5 % * significant at
10 %. The regressions are of the form pit = α+ βpi
f
t|t−1 + t, and the Bias test displays the F-values from testing
the joint hypothesis that α = 0, β = 1
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inflation measures and the different series from the survey. The point estimates from the
individual regressions are shown, as well as a test of the hypothesis that the constant and the
coefficient is jointly zero and one, respectively, against the alternative hypothesis that they
are not. The level of confidence with which the null-hypothesis can be rejected is indicated.
Rejection of the joint hypothesis that expectations are unbiased is indeed the conclusion
for most of the combinations of inflation measures and groups of forecasters. The households
fare worst, with the hypothesis of no bias being rejected in all cases, except compared to the
sticky part of the CPI. The movement in household inflation expectations seem to correlate
little with that of actual inflation – in no case is the β-coefficient significantly different from
zero on its own, and R2 is very low. Because of the low correlation between expected and
realized inflation, the point estimate of the constant almost takes on the average value of
inflation over the sample. If the expectations and actual inflation moved together more
strongly, however, I would expect a negative estimate on the constant by looking at the
graphical representation of the series, where actual inflation lies well below expectations for
all inflation measures.
The other groups that are surveyed (economists, labor organizations and business exec-
utives) fare just as badly as households in the test for unbiasedness, in most cases. These
groups’ expectations do however track inflation more closely, with point estimates of β closer
to one, and individually significantly different from zero. The regressions on CPI is an ex-
ception, as this index, containing energy prices, is very volatile compared to the more stable
expectations. Comparison with CPI is therefore not a good criterion to judge inflation ex-
pectations, which by definition take on too long a perspective to capture the sudden changes
in CPI. CPI-ATE, which excludes oil and energy prices share more of the stable feature of
expectations. Even more so does CPI-ATE-I, which is the price index on domestically pro-
duced goods and services. Table 12 suggests that the expectations measures are better able
to forecast this index than others. The explained share of variation, measured by R2 is large
for this index relative to the others, and only for household expectations is the null of no bias
rejected. The point estimates for β are very close to one for both economists and business
executives. It is perhaps reasonable that the latter group is good at forecasting this measure
of inflation, as businesses are exactly the ones who decide on the prices in this index, and
have to monitor this landscape closely to assess competition and the appropriate price. This
index is also highly relevant for labor organizations, whose bargaining position is to a large
degree determined by the level of producer prices, through the ability of firms to pay a higher
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nominal wage. The rightmost column regresses inflation expectations on goods and services
in the CPI whose prices are adjusted at infrequent intervals, CPI-S(ticky). Using this index,
Erlandsen (2014) finds that price changes for goods and services whose prices are updated
infrequently reflect forward-looking expectations to a larger degree than CPI as a whole,
meaning this part of the price index is better at forecasting future inflation. Following from
this, the inflation expectations could be assumed to be unbiased with respect to this index,
but that is not what I find. Conversely, the unbiasedness-hypothesis is strongly rejected in
all cases (with households as a surprising exception). The share variation in that index that
expectations can explain, however, is relatively large, and β usually comes close to one.
7.3 VAR estimation of inflation and survey expectations
In the time series regression framework, predictive ability of inflation expectations can be
represented by inflation expectations Granger causing actual inflation. This concept uses
the sequential nature of time series data, namely the quality that past values of the variables
are pre-determined, if the regression errors are serially independent, so that any statistical
relationship between variables that cross time periods necessarily imply causal direction from
the pre-determined variable to the other. In this context, testing for Granger-causality will
shed light on whether inflation expectations contain more information about future inflation
than past inflation does alone, which would be the case if inflation expectations actually
determine what inflation will be; a central proposition in macroeconomic theory. Inflation
expectations containing unique information about future inflation also implies that agents
utilize information on other economic variables when forming their expectations of inflation;
the VAR setup can therefore be said to be a proper test of whether inflation expectations
are rational or not. To assess whether survey expectations Granger-cause actual inflation,
Mehra (2002) specifies two equations that relates realized and expected inflation, (4) and
(5):
∆pit = a10 + λ(pit−1 − piet−1) +
n∑
k=1
a1k∆pit−s +
n∑
k=1
a2k∆pi
e
t−s + pit (4)
∆piet = a20 + µ(pit−1 − piet−1) +
n∑
k=1
a3k∆pi
e
t−s +
n∑
k=1
a4k∆pit−s + piet (5)
∆ refers to the first difference of the variables. Taking the first difference between the
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variables allows for finding the effect that a change in one variable has on the change in the
other. λ and µ are coefficients of the error correction mechanism, which delivers the long
term reversion to the other variable in case of a cointegrating relationship.40 The coefficients
measure the potential speed of convergence. Lags of both variables, up to the n-th lag, with
corresponding coefficients, also turn up on the right hand side in both equations. If any of
the aik’s (i ∈ [1, 4]) are different from zero, inflation or inflation expectations are dependent
on its own or the other’s history. The error terms are assumed to have zero mean and
constant variance, but are allowed to be interdependent
Mehra (2002) estimates the system of equations by OLS, while I have estimated the
equations jointly in a VAR, as expressed in equation (6). OLS-estimation and estimaton of
the VAR give identical coefficients, but the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms in
the VAR allow for non-zero diagonal elements, that is, the error term in each equation is
allowed to be correlated with the error term in the other. This changes the standard errors
somewhat. Results from this estimation are found in table 13. The system of equations that
(4) and (5) is represented in matrix notation in equation (6)
Π(L)∆Yt = c + Λ
′
[
1 −1
]
Yt−1 + t (6)
Where Π(L) = In − Π1L − ... − Π4L4, L is the lag operator, and Π is a vector of lag
coefficients. Yt
′ =
[
pit pi
e
t
]
, that is, the vector of the variables in the VAR, while Λ is the
vector of ECM-coefficients, and t a vector of the error terms.
Allowing for the co-movement of inflation and expectations through the ECM-term is
motivated by the hypothesis that expectations are rational, because if agents realize that
they make errors in their predictions, they would over time learn to utilize the information
in their prediction errors, and let expectations and inflation move together in the long run.
Similarly, the determining effect that expectations have on realized inflation, according to
theory, would make inflation move towards expectations. From table 13, the ECM coefficient
in equation (4) is uniformly significant and negative. This does at first sight provide support
for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between inflation expectations and realized
inflation, but a glance at figure 2 does suggest another reason for this result. It could be
that if the expectations part of the ECM is relatively constant, a high value of inflation
leads to a more negative change in inflation in the next period (the dependent variable),
40Cointegration means the variables move together in the long run, that one or both revert towards the
other if other influences makes them drift apart.
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perhaps because of monetary policy, or reversion to the mean. This contributes greatly to
the test of the lag coefficients of the survey expectations variable leading to rejection of the
null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero, as the ECM coefficient also features in
this test. Stata’s test of Granger causality (vargranger), reported just below, which only
tests the lag coefficients, leads to rejection less often. The first test therefore suggests that
the survey measures Granger-cause inflation, but this might rest on erroneous foundations.
In equation (4), if the a2-coefficients are significantly different from zero, it means that
survey expectations contain information about future inflation beyond what is inherent
in the history of inflation itself. The opposite is true for equation 5: if the a4-coefficients
are significant, past inflation contains information about survey expectations beyond what is
contained in past values of survey expectations. The sum of the lag coefficients on household
expectations are not significantly different from zero for any of the inflation measures. The
experts’ lag coefficients regarding CPI-ATE-I is positive and significant, lending a bit more
support to the proposition that survey expectations Granger-cause inflation, i.e. there is
predictive power in the survey expectations. Overall, however, these results do not give
grounds for optimism regarding survey forecasts’ ability to predict inflation, as might be
expected after the results from the bias test performed above. Parts of these results may be
due to the relatively short sample period available for Norwegian survey expectations. In
comparison, the Michigan survey, which Mehra (2002) makes use of, has observations from
several decades. This means the Michigan survey also covers the time period where inflation
in the US was reduced from the very high levels of the 70s and 80s, meaning there are large
movements in the time series of inflation, which are also found in inflation expectations. It
might be that survey measures of expectations are to crude to catch the smaller movements
in inflation that characterize inflation in Norway during the time included in the survey
sample.
Regarding the influence of actual inflation on survey expectations, there does not seem
to be any long term cointegrating relationship going in that direction. The tests of the
lag coefficients alone and together with the ECM-term agree more in this case, however,
and there seems to be evidence that inflation Granger-causes inflation expectations, which
implies that there is a backward-looking element in inflation. Past inflation can add to the
predictive accuracy of inflation expeditions more than what past inflation expectations can
on its own.
Table 6 on the next page cointains the estimation results just described. For each of the
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three groups that I have considered, there are two panels, one for each of equation (4) and
(5). Listed vertically are the estimated coefficients of the ECM and the sum of coefficients
of the opposite dependent variable. Then follows tests of the joint restriction that these
are equal to zero, and that the coefficients on the opposite variable is equal to zero. The
estimation is repeated for different inflation measures.
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Table 13: Test of rationality
CPI CPI-ATE CPI-ATE-I CPI-S
Households
pi
d
ep
.
va
r.
λ -.4094 -.1518 -.1563 -.1247
(0.003)*** ( 0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.074)**
S1 -.300 -.0248 -.0248 -1.546
(0.669) (0.9033) (0.821) (0.588)
χ21 (ecm & lags) 13.98** 20.88*** 17.44*** 5.43
χ21 (lags) 5.196 10.62 ** 7.356 1.9182
pi
e
d
ep
.
va
r.
µ .0531 .0444 .0675 .0389
(0.427) (0.62) (0.439) (0.668)
S2 0.669 .1936 .1936 -.21406
(0.816) ( 0.584) (0.282) (0.295)
χ22 (ecm & lags) 25.10*** 3.48 3.38 2.65
χ22 (lags) 23.386 *** 2.968 1.247 1.4331
Economists
pi
d
ep
.
va
r.
λ -.5026 -.2080 -.2540 -.2252
(0.003 )*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.01)**
S1 -.01720 .399 .6672 -1.546
(0.984) (0.2476) (0.0563)* (0.085)*
χ21 (ecm & lags) 19.11*** 12.58 ** 14.82** 9.31*
χ21 (lags) 7.2457 4.9864 6.6856 3.7376
pi
e
d
ep
.
va
r.
µ .0441 -.0005 .0177 -.0695
(0.444) (0.994) (0.802) (0.295)
S2 0,0398 0,418 .3940 -.2140
(0.7341) (0.027)** (0.0139)** (0.108)
χ22 (ecm & lags) 12.12*** 15.33*** 15.02** 10.60*
χ22 (lags) 7.9577* 14.242*** 10.304** 10.596**
Business executives
pi
d
ep
.
va
r.
λ -.5275 -.2792 -.2095121 -.1705
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.036)**
S1 -1.5469 -.5223 -.13816 -1.546
(0.005)*** (0.013)** (0.5315) (0.9965)
χ21 (ecm & lags) 21.06*** 18.42 *** 17.34*** 7.44
χ21 (lags) 10.124 ** 7.040 5.3351 1.980
pi
e
d
ep
.
va
r.
µ .7730 -.1012 -.1030 -.08232
(0.275) ( 0.219) (0.319) (0.336)
S2 -.21406 -.1723 .01780 -.21406
(0.144) (0.418) (0.93) (0.630)
χ22 (ecm & lags) 21.06*** 23.92*** 4.07 4.68
χ22 (lags) .917*** 21.37*** 3.1356 4.356
1: Sum of coefficients on ∆pie, S2: Sum of coefficients on ∆pi. Lag length 4. P-values in the
parantheses. * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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8 Relationship between the survey measures
The standard theory on macroeconomic expectations does not differentiate between the
expectations of different agents. The various groups are all asked about their estimate of
the same variable: CPI inflation. If all agents were rational, their expectations of this
variable should coincide. If we assume that the observed diversity in inflation expectations
is due to different access to information, this could perhaps be systematically reflected in
the respondents’ estimates, for instance by information dispersing throughout the economy
from the most informed groups to the least informed. A model that incorporates this idea
is analyzed by Carroll (2003). In the model, economic agents update their beliefs about
the economy by reading newspaper articles, where forecasts of the variables of interest are
published. The agents do not perform the forecasting themselves.41 The assumption that
agents do not necessarily employ all information they possess, but rely solely on one source
for belief updating (i.e. by reading the newspaper), is an approximation that probably
does not represent the complete expectations formation process of households, but it is an
approximation that secures analytical tractability. In this section, I will perform an analysis
of the Norwegian survey data inspired by the model of Carroll (2003). I limit my attention
to the survey expectations of households and experts, and examine whether the households’
expectations contain elements of past forecasts from professional.
In the model, a λ share of agents is assumed to register the latest information about
professional forecasts given in the most recent newspapers each quarter. The remaining 1−λ
share simply use the last information they acquired to extrapolate expectations forward.
Newspapers are assumed to contain a forecast of quarterly inflation.42 I let piet denote the
aggregate quarterly inflation expectation in period t. pift|t−s is the quarterly inflation forecast
for period t published in the newspaper at t− s. The updating-behavior of agents therefore
suggest the following relationship between expectations and news forecasts:
piet+1|t = λpi
f
t+1|t + (1− λ)(λpift+1|t−1 + (1− λ)(λpift+1|t−2 + ...+ (1− λ)λpift+1|0)) (7)
41The main relationship derived from this model is identical to the one in Mankiw and Reis (2001), where
the stickiness is assumed to arise from cost of updating infomation, while agents are rational.
42Carroll (2003) imposes a structure on agents’ beliefs about the inflation process that makes the yearly
inflation rate equal to four times the quarterly rate, so although it is the yearly inflation rate that in reality
(and in the data) is reported by forecasters and in the news, agents can derive the one from the other. Under
these assumptions, 12 months ahead inflation expectations can therefore be used in the empirical analysis.
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The agents believe experts cited in newspapers are able to forecast inflation one quarter
ahead, and that inflation develops according to a random walk after that. The forecast of
inflation the next quarter is therefore the best forecast of subsequent quarters, i.e. pift+1|t−1 =
pift|t−1, pi
f
t+1|t−2 = pi
f
t|t−2 and so on. By substituting into (7), the recursive structure lets me
write the evolution of inflation expectations as:
piet+1|t = λpi
f
t+1|t + (1− λ)piet|t−1 (8)
The resulting equation shows that the aggregate inflation expectation is a weighted
average of the rational expectation based on up-to-date information, and aggregate inflation
expectations made one quarter ago.
If a source of expectations reported in newspaper articles can be identified, the equation
can be estimated. Carroll (2003) argues that newspapers get their information by interview-
ing professionals working in financial institutions and academia. One issue with his theory
is that it only allows for a single, unified, inflation forecast that the households are assumed
to understand and remember for as long as they go without updating their information sets.
In reality, experts disagree over the future path of inflation, and newspapers do not typically
report an average of the forecasts but forecasts made by single professionals.
The model that I will later estimate differs from equation (8) in that it also includes the
lagged experts’ forecast:
piet+1|t = λpi
f
t+1|t + γpi
e
t|t−1 + µpi
f
t|t−1 (9)
Equation (9), can be derived from a similar theoretical argument as above, with the
added assumption that a µ share of agents for some reason get hold of the experts’ forecast
made one period ago instead of the current one. Then, a (1 − λ − µ) = γ share of the
agents continue to use information they acquired in prior periods. The addition of a share
of agents who get access to outdated information could reflect that there are some groups
in the economy that are privileged with real-time access to information about events in the
economy, while another share µ hearing about the news with a lag. At any rate, the only
practical consequence of this assumption is that the share of agents who possess last periods’
forecast changes from (1 − λ)λ to (1 − λ − µ)λ + µ, i.e. it is only a quantitative change
in the expectations formation process (which is unquantifiable because the parameters are
unknown).
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The reason for this addition is that (9) has the form of an Autoregressive Distributed
Lag-model, an ADL(1,1), which is a widely used method in analysing cointegrated variables.
I take this approach because the theoretical model that I have adapted from Carroll (2003)
predicts that expectations of professional forecasters and households move together in the
long run. This can be seen by rewriting (9), by adding and subtracting a few terms:
piet+1|t − piet|t−1 = (γ − 1)piet|t−1 + (µ+ λ)pift|t−1 + λ(pift+1|t − pift|t−1) (10)
Then, by denoting the change in expectations and forecast from one period to another
with a ∆, and some additional manipulation, I arrive at:
∆piet+1|t = (µ+ λ)(pi
f
t|t−1 −
1− γ
µ+ λ
piet|t−1) + λ∆pi
f
t+1|t (11)
∆piet+1|t = φ(pi
f
t|t−1 − βpiet|t−1) + λ∆pift+1|t (12)
Where φ = µ+ λ, β = 1−γ
µ+λ
. Equation (12) states that the change in household expecta-
tions is in part caused by the potential divergence between the variables, i. e. an ECM-term,
as well as the change in experts’ forecast. If the experts’ forecast should stay constant for
some reason, the households’ expectations should gradually converge towards the experts’
forecast. The first term should ensure that households’ expectations and those reported
in the news do not veer too far apart, i.e. the variables are cointegrated. In practice, the
ADL(1,1)-model is estimated in two steps, first by finding an estimate of β by estimating
equation 13:
pift|t−1 = βpi
e
t|t−1 + ut (13)
The second step is to estimate the ADL(1,1) using the estimate of the adjustment coef-
ficient β.
In the next section, I go through with the estimation of the relationships that are sug-
gested by Carroll (2003) and my ADL(1,1)-formulation.
8.1 Estimation
In order to perform the analyis of this section, I need observations of aggregate inflation
expectations and experts’ inflation forecast. Time series of 12 months ahead inflation ex-
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pectations is contained in the Epinion survey (see footnote 36). For the aggregate inflation
expectations, I use the households’ expecation measure, while the economists surveyed rep-
resent the experts in the theory.
I start by assessing whether the variables are stationary or not, before I go on to estimate
equation (12). As can be seen in table 14, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests do not
lead to rejection of the null-hypothesis of the variables having a unit root. When I do the
ADF-test on the first difference of the two variables, the null hypothesis is rejected. This
leads me to believe that the expectations variables are I(1), i.e. integrated of the first order.
I conclude from this that further analysis using the survey measures of expectations should
involve their first differences, i.e. the change in expectations, in order for it not to be invalid.
Table 14: Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots
Panel a: Inflation expectations
pie test statistic 1 % Critical value 5 % Critical value
Households -0.759 -2.620 -1.950
Experts -0.525 -2.623 -1.950
Panel b: The change in inflation expectations
∆pie test statistic 1 % Critical value 5 % Critical value
Households -6.301 -2.625 -1.950
Experts -5.316 -2.622 -1.950
Tests are augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, fitting regressions of the form ∆yt = ρyt−1 + ∆ψyt−1 + ε, where
the null hypothesis of unit root is that ρ = 0. The test statistic has a special distribution, the critical values
are therefore shown. Because the test statistics are lower in absolute value in panel a, I do not reject the
null of a unit root. For the differences in panel b, however, the test statistics are sufficiently large to reject
the null hypothesis.
As discussed, the theory I have adopted from Carroll (2003) suggests that there should be
a cointegrating relationship between the expectations of households and experts. I will test
this proposition on the Norwegian dataset. Engle and Granger’s (1987) two-step procedure
lets me test whether there is a cointegrating relationship between the variables in equation
(8). The first step is to estimate equation (8) by OLS. If both variables are I(1), the resulting
residual process would also be I(1). Therefore, testing whether the residuals are stationary
can reveal if the variables in the regression are cointegrated. The second step is therefore
to do this by performing an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals. The results
from applying this test to the sample of households’ and experts’ inflation expectations is
shown in panel a of table 15. The resulting test statistic is large enough in absolute value
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Table 15: Engle-Granger two step procedure for testing cointegration
Panel a: Test of cointegration in equation (8)
H0: test statistic 1 % Critical value 5 % Critical value
I(1) Residuals -5.460 -4.608 -3.924
Panel b: Test of cointegration in equation (13)
H0: test statistic 1 % Critical value 5 % Critical value
I(1) Residuals -4.452 -4.129 -3.464
Tests reported here are from the Engle-Granger two step procedure (1987) where the null hypothesis is
that the residuals from the relationship being tested is I(1). Critical values of this test differ from regular
ADF critical values because the test is based on residuals, a derived variable (Sjo¨, 2008). Critical values are
tabulated in MacKinnon (2010).
for me to reject the null-hypothesis that there is no co-integrating relationship between
households’ and experts’ inflation expectations. I take this as evidence that there is some
form of relationship between these variables that might take the form that Carroll (2003)
suggests. In panel b of table 15 i apply the Engle-Granger test to the first step in estimating
the ADL(1,1)-model, equation (13).
I next estimate the relationships that result from the theory I’ve described above. First, I
estimate equation (8), to get benchmark estimates which I can compare with the conclusions
that (2003) draw about the expectations formation process. He estimates the size of λ to
be .27, which means households update their information about once per year on average.
That is after imposing the restriction that the coefficients in equation 8 sum to one, a
restriction that can’t be rejected in the data, and which makes sense from the theory behind
the estimation. I also test whether this is a feature of the Norwegian data. I then estimate
my adaptation of the theory, the ADL(1,1) presented in equation (12).
Householdst = .728
(.200)
***× Expertst + .491
(.135)
***× Householdst−1 + ˆt (14)
Equation (14) is based on Carroll’s (2003) preferred model of sticky information. It excludes
a constant, as that would suggest that households always believe inflation will be higher
than what experts believe, which there is no theoretical grounds to believe. The equation is
estimated with robust standard errors, which are displayed beneath the coefficient estimates.
The restriction that the coefficient on experts’ forecast and lagged household expectations
equal one is rejected by an F-test, with F-score (p-value): 15.59 (0.0003). There seems to
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exist a similar relationship between the forecast of experts and households’ expectations as
Carroll (2003) found, but I get a coefficient on experts’ forecast that is larger in magnitude
than what Carroll (2003) finds. This implies that information is dramatically less sticky
than what is found in the American survey data. Although this seems to suggest that there
exists a mechanism where information disperses from the most informed in the expectations
formation process, calling it sticky information might not be appropriate if the updating
frequency is this strong.
I next estimate the ADL(1,1) reparameterized as a model in differences with an ECM-
term, because of my suspicion that the variables are cointegrated. This procedure consists
in two steps. The first is to get an estimate of the ECM-variable by doing a simple regression
based on equation (13):
Expertst = .681
(.013)
***× Householdst + ˆt (15)
The ECM-variable is in practice the predicted value of the residual from equation (15).
Next, this is added as a regressor in equation (12), and the equation is estimated:
∆Householdst = −.021
(.046)
+ .583
(.229)
**×(Expertst−1−.681×Householdst−1) + .959
(.269)
***×∆Expertst +ˆt
(16)
The results in equation (16) suggest that changing experts’ forecasts has an effect on the
change in households’ inflation expectations, and the magnitude is relatively large, with a
.959 percentage point change in households’ expectations for a 1 percentage point change in
experts’ forecast. The significant ECM-term in equation (16) suggests that the information
that households’ possess gradually converge to that of experts, in absence of shocks. If
experts’ forecast exceed .681 times households’ expectations, households’ expectations will
begin to increase faster. Opposite, if experts’ forecasts are lower, households’ expectations
will decrease faster.
Although the relationship between households’ expectations and experts’ forecasts seems
to be strong, pinning down the causal direction is probably a too ambitious venture based
on this analysis. The results do however align with the theory, and offers further proof
for an expectations formation process that begins at the expert level, where forecasts are
made, using relevant information about economic conditions, which then form the basis
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of households’ expectations. One implication of this relationship is that aggregate inflation
expectations can be well represented by professional forecasters’ views, as they either provide
households with the information they use to form an expectation, or the experts themselves
base their forecasts on some intuition about what aggregate inflation expectations are.
9 Conclusion
There are strong reasons to pay particular attention to the effects of expectations both in
building models of the dynamic between macroeconomic variables, and in evaluations of
which monetary policy measures are appropriate in a certain situation. Inflation expecta-
tions are important both in that they influence economic agents’ decisions today, and in
aggregate the business cycle for the whole economy, and in addition, by lending themselves
for observation and analysis, expectations can help us predict what will happen to the econ-
omy and let us take measures to avoid and counteract periodical downturns in economic
activity.
This thesis examines how well inflation expectations are understood in economic the-
ory, and how successful practical methods of measuring inflation expectations are. In the
theoretical part of this thesis, I have reviewed some proposals to explain the behavior of in-
flation expectations, as we can observe them with more or less accurate methods. Among the
noteworthy characteristics of measured inflation expectations are for instance that expecta-
tions are heterogeneous between demographic groups, and that expectations become more
forward-looking when inflation is costlier to ignore. Expectations models that incorporate
learning, sticky information and heterogeneous estimation rules are among the contributions
that have increased our understanding of how inflation expectations form to come from this
branch of the literature. The fact that such models are founded on observed inflation ex-
pectations, and subsequently shown to explain the behavior of inflation expectations well, is
not a guarantee that the models generalize well to inflation expectations in other monetary
regimes or economic circumstances. Most of the data that is used to evaluate the relevance
of such models comes from the largest American surveys of households’ and professional
forecasters’ expectations.
In the empirical part of this thesis, I have approached the challenge of gaining an under-
standing of inflation expectations in three different ways. First, by taking advantage of a
large data set of Norwegian households collected for this thesis, I analyzed the information
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gathering habits of ordinary households regarding developments in the economy, and the
knowledge they possess about inflation dynamics. I find that there is a great deal of uncer-
tainty among the respondents about how inflation will develop over the next twelve months,
uncertainty which is perhaps not reflected in the survey measures of inflation expectations in
Norway. I also find that many respondents are asked to state their expectations about future
inflation without being entirely sure about how inflation is affected by monetary policy, or
how inflation is defined. This approach of designing an exploratory survey is inspired by the
part of the literature on inflation expectations that start out from the data, either compiled
through surveys or experiments, and tries to model the expectations formation process in a
way that incorporates features of the data, some of which I have covered in the theoretical
sections of this thesis.
Second, the existence of a Norwegian survey measuring inflation expectations over time
lets me put the reliability of the theories to the test by applying it to another sample,
as well as gaining possible insights into the expectation formation process in Norway. I
adopt a model of sticky information, which has as its basic premise that only a share
of agents in the economy get access to current information that professional forecasters
communicate every period. As a result, the aggregate inflation expectations should contain
elements of professional forecasts that date from earlier periods. I evaluate this hypothesis
by formulating the relationship between households’ expectations and experts’ forecasts
as an Autoregressive Distributed Lag-model, and find that there is likely a cointegrating
relationship between the survey measures, as well as significant lagged dependency, which
supports the hypothesis that information is transmitted with a lag to a part of the households
in the economy.
Third, I start out from the idealized assumptions of the economy that macroeconomic
theory builds on, and see if the observed inflation expectations behaves in accordance with
those assumptions. The way that such tests have been operationalized has mainly concerned
the predictive power of inflation expectations over future inflation. A finding that expecta-
tions predict future inflation well is both a justification for the assumptions that are made,
as well as a sign that central banks and others can use expectations measures to good effect
in forecasting the economy. In my empirical approach, I first estimate a simple relationship
between expected 12 month ahead inflation and realized inflation, to establish whether the
survey measures have predictive value. I find that the expectations of professional fore-
casters, businesses and labor organizations track the movement of a narrow element of the
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Consumer Price Index relatively well, namely that composed of prices on goods that are
produced domestically. This is a reasonable result, considering these prices should develop in
close correspondence to fundamentals in the domestic economy, such as productivity growth
and wage inflation. Second, I formulate a VAR between the survey measures and realized
inflation, in order to test for Granger-causality between the variables, i.e. for whether infla-
tion expectations contain more information about future inflation than past inflation does
alone, which would be the case if inflation expectations actually determine what inflation
will be; a central proposition in macroeconomic theory. Inflation expectations containing
unique information about future inflation also implies that agents utilize information on
other economic variables when forming their expectations of inflation; the VAR setup can
therefore be said to be a proper test of whether inflation expectations are rational or not.
I find that households’ expectations do not Granger-cause inflation, while there is some
weak evidence that expectations of businesses and economists do, for some of the inflation
measures concerned.
Our understanding of inflation expectations will unquestionably remain incomplete,
given the complexity of the variable’s determinants. Knowledge about the process with
which inflation expectations form is building, however. The continuous effort in refining
the measurement methods of inflation expectations, and the increasing availability of data,
will open new avenues for research on the topic. In this thesis, I have aimed at providing
a synthesis of the advances on the topic so far, and apply their lessons in an analysis of
inflation expectations in Norway.
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Appendix
Original survey questions used in section 6
Hender det at du følger med p˚a økonominyheter ?
1. Nei
2. Ma˚nedlig eller sjeldnere
3. Ukentlig
4. Daglig
5. Usikker
Hvilket av følgende 5 alternativer tror du vil f˚a størst konsekvenser for økonomien i Norge
i 2015 ?
1. Kronekurs
2. Oljepris
3. Arbeidsledighet
4. Lønnsvekst
5. Inflasjon
6. Vet ikke
Veksten i konsumprisindeksen – som er prisutiviklingen p˚a varer i Norge, var i 2014 p˚a 2,0
%. Tror du denne blir høyere, lavere eller den samme i 2015 ?
1. Høyere
2. Lavere
3. Den samme
4. Vet ikke
Kan du forklare hva inflasjon er ?
1. Trykking av penger
2. Prisvekst
3. Prisvekst som er høyere enn normalt
i
4. Vet ikke
Dersom Norges Bank setter ned renten, hva tror du da skjer med inflasjonen ?
1. Forblir uendret
2. G˚ar opp
3. G˚ar ned
4. Vet ikke
ii
